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From: Marchal Bruno <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 12:25:19 +0100 (MET)

Ben Goertzel wrote:

*>Regarding octonions, sedenions and physics
*

*>Tony Smith has a huge amount of pertinent ideas on his website, e.g.
*

*>
*

*>http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/QOphys.html
*

*>http://www.innerx.net/personal/tsmith/d4d5e6hist.html
*

*>
*

*>His ideas are colorful and speculative, but also deep and interesting.
*

*>One could spend a very long time soaking up all the ideas on the site.
*

*>By the way, Tony is a very nice guy, who did a postdoc under Finkelstein (of
*

*>quantum set theory fame) and earns his living as a criminal-law attorney.
*

Yes. It is hard not to cross Tony Smith's pages, or your own,

when walking on the net with keyword like field, clifford,

or ... octonions. Yet, until now I was less than convinced, and I

was considering Smith and Smith-like colorful ideas as produced

by to much attention to mathematical mermaids. Some papers by Baez,

after my reading of Kauffman's book on knots changed my mind.

This does not mean I am convinced, but only that I am open to the

idea that such approaches could lead to the or one "right" TOE.

In any case, my own approach gives *by construction* the right TOE,

in the case if COMP is true. So if COMP is true, and if you or

Tony (or Witten or Grothendieck ...) are correct, then we must meet.

Or comp is false, or you are false.

Methodologically your ON theory suffers (at first sight)the same

problem as Wolfram, or Schmidhuber's approaches. The problem consists

in

failing to realise the fact that if we are turing-emulable, then

the association between mind-dynamics and matter-dynamics cannot be

one-one. You can still attach a mind to the appearance of a

machine, but you cannot attach a machine to the appearance of a

mind, you can only attach an infinity of machines, and histories,

to the appearance of a mind. For a proof of this see http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html

Note that the shadows of this appears in your ON paper aswell when

you talk of the many-universes, but you don't make the link with

the first and third person distinction (or the endo-exo distinction

with Rossler's vocabulary). With comp we cannot avoid that

distinction. Let me insist because some people seem not yet grasping

fully that idea.

In fact that 1/3-distinction makes COMP incompatible with

the thesis that the universe is a machine. If I am a machine then

the universe cannot be a machine. No machine can simulate the

comp first person indeterminacy. This shows that the

Wolfram-Petrov-Suze-... thesis is just inconsistent. If the universe

is a (digital) machine then there is level of description of myself

such that I am a machine (= I am turing-emulable, = comp), but then

my most probable neighborhood is given by a sum over all

computational histories going through my possible states, and by

godel (but see also the thought experiments) that leads to extract

the probable neighborhood from a non computable domain, in a

non computable way. In short WOLFRAM implies COMP, but COMP

implies NOT WOLFRAM(*). So WOLFRAM implies NOT WOLFRAM, so NOT WOLFRAM.

Eventually physics will be reduced into machine's machine

psychology. If octonion play a fundamental role in physics,

it means, with comp, that octonions will play a fundamental role

in psychology.

And, dear Ben, I should still read how you link octonions

and the "deep aspect", as you say, of the mind.

BTW, I would be also glad if you could explain or give a rough

idea how quaternions play a role in the mondane aspect of the

mind, as you pretend in one of your paper,

if you have the time.

Bruno

(*) In the *best* case, comp could imply a QUANTUM-WOLFRAM.

Received on Fri Nov 22 2002 - 06:26:00 PST

Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2002 12:25:19 +0100 (MET)

Ben Goertzel wrote:

Yes. It is hard not to cross Tony Smith's pages, or your own,

when walking on the net with keyword like field, clifford,

or ... octonions. Yet, until now I was less than convinced, and I

was considering Smith and Smith-like colorful ideas as produced

by to much attention to mathematical mermaids. Some papers by Baez,

after my reading of Kauffman's book on knots changed my mind.

This does not mean I am convinced, but only that I am open to the

idea that such approaches could lead to the or one "right" TOE.

In any case, my own approach gives *by construction* the right TOE,

in the case if COMP is true. So if COMP is true, and if you or

Tony (or Witten or Grothendieck ...) are correct, then we must meet.

Or comp is false, or you are false.

Methodologically your ON theory suffers (at first sight)the same

problem as Wolfram, or Schmidhuber's approaches. The problem consists

in

failing to realise the fact that if we are turing-emulable, then

the association between mind-dynamics and matter-dynamics cannot be

one-one. You can still attach a mind to the appearance of a

machine, but you cannot attach a machine to the appearance of a

mind, you can only attach an infinity of machines, and histories,

to the appearance of a mind. For a proof of this see http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html

Note that the shadows of this appears in your ON paper aswell when

you talk of the many-universes, but you don't make the link with

the first and third person distinction (or the endo-exo distinction

with Rossler's vocabulary). With comp we cannot avoid that

distinction. Let me insist because some people seem not yet grasping

fully that idea.

In fact that 1/3-distinction makes COMP incompatible with

the thesis that the universe is a machine. If I am a machine then

the universe cannot be a machine. No machine can simulate the

comp first person indeterminacy. This shows that the

Wolfram-Petrov-Suze-... thesis is just inconsistent. If the universe

is a (digital) machine then there is level of description of myself

such that I am a machine (= I am turing-emulable, = comp), but then

my most probable neighborhood is given by a sum over all

computational histories going through my possible states, and by

godel (but see also the thought experiments) that leads to extract

the probable neighborhood from a non computable domain, in a

non computable way. In short WOLFRAM implies COMP, but COMP

implies NOT WOLFRAM(*). So WOLFRAM implies NOT WOLFRAM, so NOT WOLFRAM.

Eventually physics will be reduced into machine's machine

psychology. If octonion play a fundamental role in physics,

it means, with comp, that octonions will play a fundamental role

in psychology.

And, dear Ben, I should still read how you link octonions

and the "deep aspect", as you say, of the mind.

BTW, I would be also glad if you could explain or give a rough

idea how quaternions play a role in the mondane aspect of the

mind, as you pretend in one of your paper,

if you have the time.

Bruno

(*) In the *best* case, comp could imply a QUANTUM-WOLFRAM.

Received on Fri Nov 22 2002 - 06:26:00 PST

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