Re: Self without context???

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2002 16:59:45 +0200

At 15:12 +0100 5/06/2002, june.shippey.domain.name.hidden wrote:



>However these theory too are within Reality and imply within themselves
>Mind and other knowledge interwoven with that also Machine is a terms
>which implies a Physical context or a system one hence a reality not a
>Non Reality?


Hence a Reality, yes. But not necessarily a physical reality.
Perhaps I should ask you what do you mean by a physical reality, and how
do you explain the presence of "qualia".



>> I don't think I could have know the notion of number without physical
>> context, but this does not logically imply that numbers *arise* from the
>> physical context.

>I see now you appear to have change your thinking from the last time I
>said this,


Not at all. I was even repeating myself. Here is the logical dependence:

NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS -> NUMBERS.

Numbers appears and reappears enfolded in histories without ends. But they
are the simplest thing which I cannot imagine falsified. I would lie to
myself accepting that the truth of Fermat proposition or of Goldbach
conjecture, depends on me or on us.


>Nore can you imply the opposite, it is harder to prove since where
>ever you go your within it!


Sure. 100% OK! But neither Newton nor Schroedinger would have dreamed
"proving" F+MA or SWE. What is the point? This shows only we have not the same
theory (although we have the same realist philosophy, I think).



>How can he since he is made of it and even if he discovers what you have
>there how can he tell if there isnt more to it and that this is just an
>abstraction???


Perhaps I underestimate the importance of uda, but uda shows exactly this.
The invariance of first-person impressions for any third person transformation
(respecting functionnal description at some level) entails that we must sum up
on all virtual realities. Even the holopeople should be able to
extract SWE, or whatever is physically true, from the comp hyp. And a
minority of them will
conclude in non comp only if you have manage to falsify him/her in
some perverse
way. This is theoretical, you will succeed only if
you know the measure on consistent histories allowed by comp and if you use it
to (perversely) falsify his inferences. And that will be an infinite game.


>Machine implies Physical does it not without a Context system based or
>Physical this would not have been discovered and can be operated upon?


Church thesis makes any UM a potentially universal context.


>Dont confuse Physical with just fixed Classical rules?

?

>What kick back are part which we name words numbers etc.... and these
>are abstraction of different things some of which we group differently?
>
>I dont see people saying when a rock hits them oh there that 2 AGIAN. ;D



Nor do I say that when I am hit by a rock in a dream. The number 2 is more
solid than the Hilbert Space or any algebra needed to describe a rock. IMO.


>[Bruno]
>> Of course we will never be sure of any theory (but that is not the
>> point, is it?).
>> Nor can we solve all questions. For exemple we cannot solve the question
>> of the origin of natural numbers.

[Gordon]
Patterns you mean all depends on how you look at things?

Not at all. "17 is prime" does not depend on any point of view.


>psychology Hmm I dont recall that being a science yet?


I mean the logic of provability by sound universal machine. Psychology is
more short and actually more correct, with the hyp comp (nobody ask you to
buy it). The first fundamental theorem in "computationnalist" psychology
is that IF we are consistent THEN we cannot prove it (Godel 1931).
The first consequence of that, with respect to the mind-body problem, is
that the geometry/topology/algebra of our *consistent* extensions is quite
non trivial.


>Agreed we are alike in some ways but our differences are more
>interesting dont you agree?


Only if there is a genuine attempt to understand the difference :) Isn't it?
Remember my "proposition" (that we are machine) is testable.


>I shall and thanks has for not using Hilbert space ...

That's another thread but why are you so angry with Hilbert Space?
Are you angry with vector space too? How to dispense with them at
the beginning (at least).


>Also David Peat Certainty to Uncertianty, Ian stewarts Collapse of
>Chaos, these last to are more Philosophy based and cover a wide area,and
>show how it had to escape and see Reality outline.Why I think it best to
>develop within Reality and try to bring different Knowlegde together and
>from there see whats beyond other wise we end up going round in circle
>which is what NON-Reality group have done for 50 years.Aprat from your
>self who aleast try to put somthing behind it!


I insist: I do not belong to the NON-reality view. You must not
conflate a priori "Reality" and "Physical Reality". Unless you *postulate*
at the start that the physical is the fundamental, but then we should
not even discuss, isn't it?
Now I *do* believe in Physical Reality. But I do not believe Physical Reality
is fundamental. Well, actually I don't know: I just say that IF we are
machine then "Physical Reality" *cannot* be fundamental, and *must* be
explained by some measure on our relative consistent extensions.

It is not because I need eyes to see the moon that the moon needs
my eyes to exist. It is not because I need a brain for playing with numbers
that numbers needs my brain for existing. Nor your's, with my respect :)

It is more easy to explain the mind/moon/eyes relations from numbers than
explaining relation between numbers from the mind/moon/eyes relations.

But even if that was less easy, with comp it is not a matter of choice,
(if you disagree it is up to you finding a flaw in the uda reasoning).

Bruno
Received on Fri Jun 07 2002 - 08:00:01 PDT