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From: H J Ruhl <HalRuhl.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 20:36:29 -0700

Dear Wei:

I am interested because currently I find it impossible to support the

concept of a decision.

I see either a global computational arrival at a next state from the

current state or a transition to a next state that is at least partially

the result of information received from an external random oracle.

I see both of these types of universes as essential in the ensemble and

also that they both randomly convert into their opposite type.

Neither seems to support the idea of decision dependent arrivals at a next

state. Further any illusion of a selection of a next state to be

transitioned to is already the next state which must have been either

computationally or noisily arrived at.

Hal

At 4/17/02, you wrote:

*>How many people here share my interest in decision theory as it relates to
*

*>the all universes hypothesis? I recently found two papers that seem
*

*>relevant:
*

*>
*

*>---
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*>
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*>http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~blipman/Papers/axiom.pdf
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*>
*

*>Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework
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*>for Bounded Rationality
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*>
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*>Barton L. Lipman
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*>
*

*>I propose modeling boundedly rational agents as agents who are not
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*>logically omniscient — that is, who do not know all logical or
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*>mathematical implications of what they know. I show how a subjective state
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*>space can be derived as part of a subjective expected utility
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*>representation of the agent’s preferences. The representation exists under
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*>very weak conditions. The representation uses the familiar language of
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*>probability, utility, and states of the world in the hope that this makes
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*>this model of bounded rationality easier to use in applications.
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*>
*

*>---
*

*>
*

*>http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9906015
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*>
*

*>Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions
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*>
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*>David Deutsch
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*>
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*>The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally
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*>obtained from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary
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*>because all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the
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*>remaining, non-probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the
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*>non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory.
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*>
*

*>---
*

*>
*

*>I would like to discuss these papers if anyone else is interested.
*

Received on Wed Apr 17 2002 - 17:38:15 PDT

Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2002 20:36:29 -0700

Dear Wei:

I am interested because currently I find it impossible to support the

concept of a decision.

I see either a global computational arrival at a next state from the

current state or a transition to a next state that is at least partially

the result of information received from an external random oracle.

I see both of these types of universes as essential in the ensemble and

also that they both randomly convert into their opposite type.

Neither seems to support the idea of decision dependent arrivals at a next

state. Further any illusion of a selection of a next state to be

transitioned to is already the next state which must have been either

computationally or noisily arrived at.

Hal

At 4/17/02, you wrote:

Received on Wed Apr 17 2002 - 17:38:15 PDT

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