--- http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~blipman/Papers/axiom.pdf Decision Theory without Logical Omniscience: Toward an Axiomatic Framework for Bounded Rationality Barton L. Lipman I propose modeling boundedly rational agents as agents who are not logically omniscient — that is, who do not know all logical or mathematical implications of what they know. I show how a subjective state space can be derived as part of a subjective expected utility representation of the agent’s preferences. The representation exists under very weak conditions. The representation uses the familiar language of probability, utility, and states of the world in the hope that this makes this model of bounded rationality easier to use in applications. --- http://xxx.lanl.gov/abs/quant-ph/9906015 Quantum Theory of Probability and Decisions David Deutsch The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally obtained from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the remaining, non-probabilistic, axioms of quantum theory, together with the non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory. --- I would like to discuss these papers if anyone else is interested.Received on Wed Apr 17 2002 - 15:26:42 PDT
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