---- Marchal wrote: > Levy wrote: > > >Marchal wrote: > > > >> It is better to read (change in capital): > >> > >> <<This is of course still countable when you look at the domain > >> from a third person point of view. But, as you aknowledge in > >> question 7, the delays does not count for the first person, so > >> the domain of 1-indeterminacy, which BEARS ON first persons EXPERIENCE > >> is, thanks of that delays elimination, given by the > >> union (which is just the set theoretical interpretation of the or) > >> of all portion of UD* (the execution of the UD, an infinite > >> three dimensional cone in case the UD is implemented in a > >> two dimensional cellular automaton) in which my "preparing coffee" > >> state appear. (Reread that sentence slowly, I have written > >> it slowly, and without doubts it's too long).>> > >> > >> So it is a third person measure on first person experiences. > > > >ssssiiiiiigggggghhhhhhh!!!!!! > >I read the sentence many times and it still does not make sense to me. > >Should I read it again? > > Read it three times at breakfast, and one time in the evening > jumping the parenthesis. > > Ok, ok. My diagnostic is that either you have forget the question > 7 or 8, (see below) or you are forgetting what the UD does. > > >What is: > >"the union of all portion of UD* in which my "preparing coffee" state > >appear." > > Suppose that the UD is written in Fortran. I guess you know what the > trace of a program is. > > UD* is the infinite trace of the UD. It is describe by the > sequence of its subsequent states (as a program fortran). > > It is an infinite tree describing all possible computations in fortran. > (which includes fortran simulation of all program in Lisp, all Fortran > simulation of the COBOL version 5.3 emulation of all linear > transformations, > all the unitary transformations, etc. > > Some of those computations will generate the 3-states corresponding to my > "preparing coffe 1-state". Because we accept comp. Now if I prepare a > cup of coffee, my brain will go through a sequence of states (third person > describable computational state, at the right level of description > of myself). and I have pick one of those state---like in a duplication > experiment). > > So the UD generates that state eventually (by going through a computation > which emulates my doing or dreaming of doing that cup of coffe). > > The UD will generates that state eventually. Let us say in 10^googol > years (or steps). Our poor "universe" has disappeared, but we don't > care because the UD run in Plato Heaven, or if you prefer, > the whole UD* (the trace of the UD) lies staticaly but completely > in Plato heaven). UD* is the block "mindscape" (mindscape borrowed to > Rudy Rucker's "Infinity and the Mind".). > > And we don't care of the number of steps and of the time that UD would > have > take to get that states because, as first person we cannot be aware > of those delays. Ok? > > Please reread ten billions times, after lunch, the question 7 and 8. > Especially 8. (copy and past from > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html below) > > Note in passing that a copy and paste is a duplication without > annhilation of the original. > > The apparition in UD* of that third person description of the precise > state "where is my cup now?" (occuring when I am preparing my > cup of coffee (existing by comp)) is provided by the fact that > the UD generates all computations. > > Saying yes to 7 and 8, makes that "event", executed by the UD > equivalent with a delayed reconstitution without demolition of the > original. > > So with comp you *must* bet that at each instant you are copy and paste > somewhere in your domain of indeterminacy. > > But, after a much longer time (much > longer that 10^googol (the DU *dovetails*, so that it has a lot of work > while generating and executing the other programs) it generates a new > reconstitution of that states, so he builds little by little your > entire domain of 1-indeterminacy. The fact that the DU builds the > reconstitutions so slowly does not change the first person > experience because of the non awareness of the delay. > > So when I am preparing my coffee cup, if I want to predict my next > possible instant, I must have a measure on the set of computational > histories generated by the DU going through the state corresponding > to my particular "preparing my coffee cup" state. Or a measure > on all the "reconsitution" in UD*. > > We just cannot care that some of those reconstitution appears > at step n1, some other at step n2, other at step n3, .... > The domain of reconstitution will be the union of all the portion > (subset or substring or subspace, or whatever > depending on the choice of representation) > ... portion containing the virtual (or arithmetical) reconstitution. > > Find a LISP interpreteur, run the UD at > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2793.html > If you don't like LISP, write yourself a UD in COBOL (why not) > Run it. > Stop it after two days. You have a portion of UD*. > Stop it after three days, you get a bigger portion of UD*. > By comp there is a day it will generate (and "reconstitute" de > facto) my coffee-state of mind (the 3-comp state corresponding > for that state which exist. > > If you answer yes to question 8, you should understand > why it is not necessary to > annihilate me when I am in that state, here in Brussels, for > making myself survive somewhere in UD*. > > Even if there is a "real physical universe", if you accept comp, > you can bet the next instant that you have been copy and past in UD*. > So it is preferable to accept we have never leave it. > > The only way to hunt the white rhabbits is to extract > Turing tropically the stability of regularities. > > All this a priori. No doubt some equivalence quotient can be > attempted relatively, and some structure can exists on those > first person view of the computational neigborhood. > (And that happen indeed in the arithmetical translation of > the UDA). > > >Is the cone in space, time, or what? Why three dimensions? > > 3 = 2 (because of the two dimensionality of the chosen CA (for exemple > game of life)- + 1 (time step). Little more below. > > >Why > >not four or five? Where are these dimensions coming from? > > >From the choice of cellular automata for describing the "programs" > > >The sentence is > >not too long... it's just that it assumes too much background. > > Sorry. (I was talking to Joel, Please look Joel'CA animation > which illustrates. But no problem keeping COBOL. For running > a UD any UM is good enough ...). > > >How > >does UD* relate to UD? Is it the complement, the conjugate, the inverse, or > >what? > > Yes I should have recall that. See above. It is just the trace of the UD. > A description of its execution. An infinite tree, or graphe, or set, > or cone, according to the representation you prefer. > > >In any case, the whole issue of restricting an implementation to a > >particular cellular automaton in any dimensional configuration is abhorrent > >to me. > > A particular universal one which generates all executions in all > language. The choice of the universal system does not matter. Why not > a CA? > > >If finite inputs are considered any automaton can be replaced with a > >huge look up table. > > Not those with growing memories. In particular not the universal > one. > > >And as any electrical engineer knows, any automaton, > >Turing machine or computer can be implemented by circuits consisting solely > >of NAND gates (with additional initialization levels of 0 and 1.) That's > >it. Just NAND gates. Pure logic. No three dimensional cones or any other > >kinds of cones. > > Yes but please give it as much rubber, space, virtual memory, etc, > as long it generated UD*. > > This is just a question of language. I was talking CA with Joel, because > he talks CA. > > Do you know the game of life. The fact that the game of life is > universal makes it (for me) a perfect way for talking on UD and UD*. > > The UD, in the game of life, is a finite life pattern. > And its trace is just the sequence > of evolution step put on top of each other. Of course the pattern > extends itself 3-dimensionaly (it generates all programs, and > runs more and more executions). > > You stop it after one day. You get a truncated cone. > Two day, a bigger one. etc. > UD* is the infinite cone. It is just a representation. No problem > choosing nand circuits, quantum nor circuits, or cobol version x. > > I hope this helps. Tell me. > > Bruno > > ===================== Question 7 & 8 ================= > from http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m2992.html > > Question 7: You are at Brussels (let us say), ready for a duplication WM. > Let us consider the two following 3-experiments/1-experiences: > > 1) just the simple duplication WM, where the W and M reconstitutions are > made simultaneously. > 2) A duplication WM where an arbitrary reconstitution delay is made at > Moscow. > > Do you agree that again the two sets of 1-experiences remains unchanged > (from a 1-pov), although they are 3-different? > Put in another way, do you agree that if we quantify the WM > 1-indeterminacy > by a uniform probability distribution, then you should do the same for > the second experiment. > > That question is a mix of question 3 and question 5. > The following question is question 7 with a null delay. > > Question 8: Let us consider the simple teleportation Sofia Brussels. > Except that now we don't destroy the original at Sofia. Or, if you prefer > we detroy it and rebuild at the same place in zero time. > Do you agree that in case P(W) = P(M) = 1/2 in the WM duplication then > P(S) = P(B) = 1/2 in the Sofia Brussels teleportation without destruction > of the original?Received on Thu Jul 05 2001 - 16:42:26 PDT
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