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From: Stephen Paul King <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 18:58:31 -0500

Hi George,

A few questions and comments...

George Levy wrote:

*> Marchal wrote:
*

*>
*

*> > But COMP implies MWI (Note that Schmidhuber and me agree on that,
*

*> > >> but we disagree on what *are* the (many) worlds MW).
*

*> >
*

*> > More precisely: COMP implies MWI in two senses.
*

*> >
*

*> > 1) Everett's sense: SE + COMP gives MW.
*

*>
*

*> He really meant SE + No( privileged observer status) -> MW. One could argue then
*

*> that No(privileged observer status) is implied by COMP.
*

*>
*

*> > 2) COMP sense: COMP gives SE + MW (my thesis, look at my CC&Q paper)
*

*>
*

*> I agree that COMP implies first person indeterminacy but, as far as I know, it
*

*> does not predict Schoedinger Equation in all its splendor, including Planck's
*

*> constant which is a parameter in this equation. So would it be more accurate to
*

*> say COMP implies Indeterminacy + MW?
*

*>
*

*> >
*

*> > [BM] I pretend that with comp a world is a
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*> > first person (plural) construct. [Schmidhuber] does not defined them but he
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*> > associates
*

*> > them with their generating programs. Observers belongs to worlds, with
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*> > Schmidhuber. I pretend with comp that observers's infered worlds are
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*> > defined by the set of the consistent extensions.
*

*>
*

*> I assume "consistent extensions" means "logically consistent extensions of the
*

*> observers". In which case we agree fully on the meaning of worlds. Schmidhuber,
*

*> just like Mallah, is stuck with the third person perspective.
*

[SPK]

I agree, but it seems that people are "stuck" trying to define the first person

perspective...

*> > [GL] >Again to clarify... the word "machine" means that consciousness arises
*

*> > from
*

*> > >simple (Turing-like) computations. This is the COMP hypothesis.
*

*> >
*

*> > [BM] In first approximation YES. In second approximation NOT REALLY.
*

*> > By comp I mean I survive with an artificial digital brain/body/universe.
*

*> > As a counter-intuitive conclusion, consciousness does not really
*

*> > supervenes on a computation but on an infinite cloud of "similar"
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*> > computations existing in UD*.
*

[SPK]

It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the simple

reason that consciousness is not "pre-specifiable" in its behaviour. Have you read

Peter Wegner's papers about this?

*> I have reached almost the same conclusion, that our consciousness come about from
*

*> an ensemble of more or less identical "points" or states in the plenitude and the
*

*> "thickness" of this ensemble is a measure of the Heisenberg uncertainty. The
*

*> difference is that you call them "computation." I view them more as instantaneous
*

*> static entities which are logically connected to each other. Maybe we could
*

*> resolve this issue by saying that I focus on the points of the graph and you, on
*

*> the links :-)
*

[SPK]

Could you elaborate on the nature of this "logical connection?"

*> > [BM] Locally a brain/body/universe only makes it
*

*> > possible for a person (the one conscious) to accelerate himself
*

*> > relatively to its most probable possible extensions. Note that this gives
*

*> > a role to consciousness : self-speeding up abilities.
*

*> > And this is linked to another result by Godel. If you add an undecidable
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*> > true statement to the theory (in which that sentence is undecidable), not
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*> > only an infinity of new formula become decidable, but an infinity of
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*> > provable formula get shorter proofs.
*

*> >
*

*>
*

*> You are accelerating too fast for me... I don't understand this at all.
*

*>
*

*> >
*

*> > >I am not sure I understand "shared computational histories". Why would past
*

*> > >computational states be relevant? A current state could be reached from
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*> > >different past points (OMs) unless "merging" is not allowed
*

*> >
*

*> > Merging is allowed through amnesia. In some sense personal memories
*

*> > help you to stay into no merging histories.
*

*>
*

*> I smell a whiff of third person thinking. I'll say something, then I'll retract
*

*> it because I just don't have the words to say it straight. An observer in world A
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*> who has a "false" memory (of something that did not happen in world A), is in
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*> the same mental state as an observer in world B who has a true memory ( of
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*> something that happended in world B). The two observers are in exactly identical
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*> states, even though their "shared histories" are different. The point is that
*

*> their mental states are the same, they have the same consciousness, they are
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*> really the same observer and they are really in the same world.
*

*> Now I can retract what I said. There is no world A and B and there is no shared
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*> history. The important thing is only the current state of the observer(s). The
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*> extensions to the observer are fuzzy.
*

*>
*

*> > [GL] >...Isn't the current state only of relevance?
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*> >
*

*> > Relevance with respect to what? A state is not enough, you need a
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*> > universal machine to support it.
*

*>
*

*> Precisely. With respect to us!. We are the machine....it's a vicious circle...we
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*> are self emergent...Not only is our world anthropically defined, but we ourselves
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*> also are....
*

*>
*

*> > It is more "sharing a common history" like the bifurcation W and M.
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*> > Biological multiplication gives a simple model of tree like
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*> > developpement where individuals share a long common history. The more you
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*> > leave the leaves (!) the more the histories are shared. This is an image
*

*> > because both with comp and/or QM, we must take into account merging.
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*> > (I know you agree with that).
*

*> > >From inside UD* (i.e. from the average first person point of view of
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*> > machines) I make the conjecture that there is no ultimate well-defined
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*> > trunk for these barnches and leaves. From the third person view there
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*> > is one which is just the trivial one: UD.
*

*> >
*

*>
*

*> Your use of the words "shared histories" partially seem to carry some old
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*> fashioned baggage from the days when time was thought to be linear. Yet you do
*

*> accept the concept of bifurcation and merging...
*

*>
*

*> Can conventional mechanics support consciousness spliting and merging? I don't
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*> think so. Here is why.
*

*> There are two cases to consider: state machines in the continuum and state
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*> machines in discrete space.
*

*>
*

*> In phase space with the cardinality of the continuum, each point has a unique
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*> past and a unique future. Another way to say this is that if we could make state
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*> machine with continuous states, each machine state would have a unique antecedent
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*> and a unique future. Except at singularities, no crossing is allowed in continuous
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*> phase space... transition lines could get arbitrairly close to each other but
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*> could never reach each other. .I would look at state machines transitions more
*

*> like a fluid flow. Singularities could have no future because any future would be
*

*> indeterminate. Given their indeterminate future, their past would also be
*

*> questionable if we are willing to accept time reversal.
*

[SPK]

Your phase space seems to be topologically "simply-connected," why? There is a

theorem by M.C. Mackey and another fellow whose name escapes me that shows that a

phase space of an invertible system can have "traces" (subsets) that are isomorphic to

phase spaces of irriversible systems. This have some bearing on what you wrote here...

*> Phase space transitions in discrete space, however, can merge. Once merged, they
*

*> stay merged forever. Splitting is not allowed. State machines can reach the same
*

*> state from different states. Once in similar state they stay similar.
*

*> otherwise, it would generate indeterminacy.
*

*>
*

*> The point is that merging seems to be possible but splitting is difficult. You
*

*> could have splitting of consciousness, if, instead of considering consciousness as
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*> a single point represented by definite states, you are willing to consider a fuzzy
*

*> region comprised of a multitude of points. Then any transitions out of this region
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*> would be "splitting" This type of consciousness fuzzy region) would make
*

*> indeterminacy MANDATORY! In practice the existence of this fuzzy region is hinted
*

*> at by Planck's constant.
*

*>
*

*> >
*

*> >
*

*> > [GL] >Why the word "projection?"
*

*> >
*

*> > [BM] Or "common anticipation". Like F=ma, or SE, ... We take it as a trunk,
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*> > when it is perhaps just a branch. See above.
*

*> >
*

*>
*

*> Ok. I call this, "common frame of reference."
*

*>
*

*> George
*

Kindest regards,

Stephen

Received on Sun Mar 18 2001 - 16:02:15 PST

Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2001 18:58:31 -0500

Hi George,

A few questions and comments...

George Levy wrote:

[SPK]

I agree, but it seems that people are "stuck" trying to define the first person

perspective...

[SPK]

It is trivial to show that TM's can not give rise to consciousness for the simple

reason that consciousness is not "pre-specifiable" in its behaviour. Have you read

Peter Wegner's papers about this?

[SPK]

Could you elaborate on the nature of this "logical connection?"

[SPK]

Your phase space seems to be topologically "simply-connected," why? There is a

theorem by M.C. Mackey and another fellow whose name escapes me that shows that a

phase space of an invertible system can have "traces" (subsets) that are isomorphic to

phase spaces of irriversible systems. This have some bearing on what you wrote here...

Kindest regards,

Stephen

Received on Sun Mar 18 2001 - 16:02:15 PST

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