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From: Saibal Mitra <smitra.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2001 17:05:12 +0100

Bruno wrote:

*> Saibal Mitra wrote:
*

*>
*

*> >Instead of the previously discussed suicide experiments to test various
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*> >versions of many-worlds theories, one might consider a different
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approach.

*> >
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*> >By deleting certain sectors of one's memory one should be able to travel
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*> >to different branches of the multiverse. Suppose you are diagnosed with
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*> >a rare disease. You don't have complaints yet, but you will die
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*> >within a year. If you could delete the information that you have this
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*> >particular disease (and also the information that information has
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*> >been deleted), branches in which you don't have the disease
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*> >merge with the branches in which you do have the disease. So with
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*> >very high probability you have travelled to a different branch.
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*>
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*> Be careful because in the process you take the risk of losing a friend.
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*> More aptly (3 1 switch) a friend risks losing you.
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*>
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*> Do you agree that at *some* level we do that all the time?
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*> Does death works as personal local and relative memory eraser ?
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*> Your suggestion is risky, if not egoist, but, is there another way
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*> when the rare disease is fatal?
*

Indeed. Death will erase my memory anyway, so why not do it in a controlled

way

to maximize the probability of some desired outcome.

*>
*

*> Thought experiment with speculative memory capture raised quickly
*

*> the interesting question: how many (first) person exists, really.
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*> I don't know the answer. One ?
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Why not an infinite number?

*>
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*>
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*> In another post Saibal wrote:
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*>
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*> >I think the source of the problem is equation 1 of Jürgens paper. This
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*> >equation supposedly gives the probability that I am in a particular
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*> >universe, but it ignores that multiple copies of me might exist in one
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*> >universe. Let's consider a simple example. The prior probability of
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*> >universe i (i>0) is denoted as P(i), and i copies of me exist in universe
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*> >i. In this case, Jürgen computes the propability that if you pick a
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*> >universe at random, sampled with the prior P, you pick universe i. This
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*> >probability is, of course, P(i). Therefore Jürgen never has to identify
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*> >how many times I exist in a particular universe, and can ignore what
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*> >consciousness actually is.
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*> >
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*> >Surerly an open univere where an infinite number of copies of me exist is
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*> >infinitely more likely than a closed universe where I don't have any
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*> >copies, assuming that the priors are of the same order?
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*>
*

*>
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*> Would you agree that a quantum multiverse could play the role of a
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*> particular "open universe where an infinite number of
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*> copies of me exists"?
*

I agree that this could be the case.

*> If you agree, would that mean we have "anthropic reasons" to believe
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*> in a quantum-like multiverse?
*

That's an interesting point!

Saibal

Received on Sat Mar 03 2001 - 08:42:22 PST

Date: Sat, 3 Mar 2001 17:05:12 +0100

Bruno wrote:

approach.

Indeed. Death will erase my memory anyway, so why not do it in a controlled

way

to maximize the probability of some desired outcome.

Why not an infinite number?

I agree that this could be the case.

That's an interesting point!

Saibal

Received on Sat Mar 03 2001 - 08:42:22 PST

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