Re: (Quantum) suicide not necessary?

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed Feb 21 06:45:54 2001

Saibal Mitra wrote:

>Instead of the previously discussed suicide experiments to test various
>versions of many-worlds theories, one might consider a different approach.
>
>By deleting certain sectors of one's memory one should be able to travel
>to different branches of the multiverse. Suppose you are diagnosed with
>a rare disease. You don't have complaints yet, but you will die
>within a year. If you could delete the information that you have this
>particular disease (and also the information that information has
>been deleted), branches in which you don't have the disease
>merge with the branches in which you do have the disease. So with
>very high probability you have travelled to a different branch.

Be careful because in the process you take the risk of losing a friend.
More aptly (3 1 switch) a friend risks losing you.

Do you agree that at *some* level we do that all the time?
Does death works as personal local and relative memory eraser ?
Your suggestion is risky, if not egoist, but, is there another way
when the rare disease is fatal?

Thought experiment with speculative memory capture raised quickly
the interesting question: how many (first) person exists, really.
I don't know the answer. One ?


In another post Saibal wrote:

>I think the source of the problem is equation 1 of Jürgens paper. This
>equation supposedly gives the probability that I am in a particular
>universe, but it ignores that multiple copies of me might exist in one
>universe. Let's consider a simple example. The prior probability of
>universe i (i>0) is denoted as P(i), and i copies of me exist in universe
>i. In this case, Jürgen computes the propability that if you pick a
>universe at random, sampled with the prior P, you pick universe i. This
>probability is, of course, P(i). Therefore Jürgen never has to identify
>how many times I exist in a particular universe, and can ignore what
>consciousness actually is.
>
>Surerly an open univere where an infinite number of copies of me exist is
>infinitely more likely than a closed universe where I don't have any
>copies, assuming that the priors are of the same order?


Would you agree that a quantum multiverse could play the role of a
particular "open universe where an infinite number of
copies of me exists"?
If you agree, would that mean we have "anthropic reasons" to believe
in a quantum-like multiverse?

Bruno
Received on Wed Feb 21 2001 - 06:45:54 PST