>Suppose that the simulated prisoner is a ``digital ´´ copy of a real
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>[...] If the simulated time also corresponds exactly to real time then
>the probability of the prisoner finding himself in the simulated world is
>almost exactly 1/2.
Why ?
Even if the simulated time does not correspond to the real time the
probability of the prisoner finding himself in the simulated world is 1/2.
Unless you solve Jacques Mallah's desperate implementation problem
(see the archive or Mallah's URL) you will not be able to use "time"
to define the measure on the prisoner's experiences.
>From the point of view of the
prisonner, if COMP is correct, he cannot make any difference
between real or un-real-time. Time (like
space) is a construction of the observer's mind and is defined only in a
relative way. What you need to do is to defined a notion of first person
(or subjective) time *from* the measure on the possible computationnal
continuation of the prisoner's mind.
Note also that there is no "real" time in any many-world view of
relativistic quantum mechanics (even without COMP).
With COMP (which you are using here) there is no real time nor is there
any need for such a thing.
More on this in the archive at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1726.html
Bruno
Received on Tue Aug 29 2000 - 02:42:58 PDT