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From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Mon Jun 5 07:04:30 2000

Jacques Mallah wrote:

*>--- Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
*

*>> Jacques Mallah wrote:
*

*>> > The substrate is all of the math. For example,
*

*>> >you use a substrate, in the form of a UD.
*

*>>
*

*>> This is a too poor definition of substrate. Such
*

*>> definition obliterates the apparent (at least)
*

*>> distinction we make between an immaterial
*

*>> mathematical [being] like PI or a Hilbert Space, and
*

*>> concrete single substancial [being] like my computer
*

*>> screen here, and now. We must explain how *in the
*

*>> math* such distinction appears, and remains
*

*>> (apparently) stable.
*

*>
*

*> I'm not sure I see your point. What exactly do
*

*>you want to explain?
*

I was just saying that if we take a purely mathematical

ontology we must adress the problem of explaining

the phenomenology of the apparent concrete singular

substance. Even if we derive the physical laws from the

"mathematical laws" (explaing the absence of wabbits), we

must still explain what appears to be a electron, a moon,

etc. I guess you know that ...

*> As you know, I would find the measure distribution
*

*>of conscious computations by counting their
*

*>implementations.
*

And my remark was that you need to define what is an

implementation without using a physical predicate (if you

say that the physics is in the math). Or you must

explain the appearence of physical predicate from the

math. Beware vicious circles.

*> With the UD example, if there is some program in
*

*>the UD'd set that acts like a universe simulation, it
*

*>will probably give rise to most of those.
*

In case you succeed in proving that, you will be very

near the solution of both the mind/body problem and the

problem of the origin of the physical laws.

Remember that I don't take the "Kolmogorov/schmidhuber"

"prior" solution is enough, although there are

some correct points in it (IMO). (See my older post).

You cannot attach consciousness to ONE program emulated

by the UD, you need to take into account ALL "similar"

program.

We are back to our old dicussion here. You will make

disappear the 3-Wabbits. But with comp (cf UDA) you need

to make disappear the 1-wabbits too. (Do you remember ?)

*>It will
*

*>have "brains" which are the sub-parts giving rise to
*

*>such [consciousness].
*

With comp or with QM you will not be able to define in

a univocal way what *is* a sub-part.

Bruno

Received on Mon Jun 05 2000 - 07:04:30 PDT

Date: Mon Jun 5 07:04:30 2000

Jacques Mallah wrote:

I was just saying that if we take a purely mathematical

ontology we must adress the problem of explaining

the phenomenology of the apparent concrete singular

substance. Even if we derive the physical laws from the

"mathematical laws" (explaing the absence of wabbits), we

must still explain what appears to be a electron, a moon,

etc. I guess you know that ...

And my remark was that you need to define what is an

implementation without using a physical predicate (if you

say that the physics is in the math). Or you must

explain the appearence of physical predicate from the

math. Beware vicious circles.

In case you succeed in proving that, you will be very

near the solution of both the mind/body problem and the

problem of the origin of the physical laws.

Remember that I don't take the "Kolmogorov/schmidhuber"

"prior" solution is enough, although there are

some correct points in it (IMO). (See my older post).

You cannot attach consciousness to ONE program emulated

by the UD, you need to take into account ALL "similar"

program.

We are back to our old dicussion here. You will make

disappear the 3-Wabbits. But with comp (cf UDA) you need

to make disappear the 1-wabbits too. (Do you remember ?)

With comp or with QM you will not be able to define in

a univocal way what *is* a sub-part.

Bruno

Received on Mon Jun 05 2000 - 07:04:30 PDT

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