Re: this very moment

From: Marchal <>
Date: Fri May 19 07:26:27 2000

Brent Meeker wrote (in part)

>Whether you think of them [the person, the mental life,
>the external physical world] as *really* existing (which
>I do) or not, your theory must at least
>explain why they seem to exist to some sentient beings
>who also seem to exist.

Indeed. I have proposed a deductive argument showing that:
IF we are machine (in the sense that we are able to survive
with a digitalisable brain/body) (= computationnalism = comp)
THEN physics is a branch of "machine's psychology". (I call
that result : REVERSAL).

The reduction of physics to psychology is both:
1) Epistemological : physics is a branch of machine's psychology
which is itself a branch of theoretical computer science, which
can be embedded itself in number theory.
2) Ontological : appearance of matter emerges from mind (number)

Then by taking the godelian provability logic as ``exact
psychology" of the universal (turing) machine, I derive
a quantum logic by translating my argument into arithmetic, but
also a phenomenology of the appearance of "All Universes",
indeterminism, non-locality, linearity, etc.

Roughly put : what really exists are numbers and their relations.
These relations entails the arithmetical existence of
the set of all possible computations. Matter and physics
are that set, as machine are able to talk ``from inside that set".

I prove the reversal by an argument called UDA in the list.
(UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument).
There is a summary of UDA in the archive :

It is idealism. True. There is nothing ``semantic" in that
statement. If comp is correct the physical multiverses emerges
from numbers dream in a sufficiently precise sense for deriving
physics (but not geography!) from number theory.
Put in another way : Pythagore and Platon were right.
Aristotle was wrong. (Despite the fact that Aristotle invented
most of the modern tools of rigorous philosophy, like modal
logics, etc.)

I apologise for my too concise and oversimplified account
of what I am trying to say ...

Received on Fri May 19 2000 - 07:26:27 PDT

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