RE: History-less observer moments

From: Higgo James <james.higgo.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 16 May 2000 12:33:36 +0100

Yes but there is NEVER any objective way of saying 'this is before that' -
it is always subjective.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Brent Meeker [SMTP:meekerdb.domain.name.hidden]
> Sent: Tuesday, 16 May, 2000 4:54 AM
> To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden
> Subject: Re: History-less observer moments
>
> On 14-May-00, Russell Standish wrote:
> > The idea of "observer moment" initially presupposes that the moment
> > has no temporal duration - it is instantaneous. The problem with this,
> > is that there is no time whatsoever in which the observer can
> > experience its moment. In particular, the observer is unable to
> > implement a Turing machine, hence computationalism is false.
> >
>
> >
> > If we then introduce the concept of an extended observer moment with
> > duration, what duration should we choose? If shorter than a "quantum of
> > conscious time" (about 1/10th of a second), then how does one explain
> the
> > accrual of knowledge about the observer moment. How can you be aware of
> > historical data? If longer, then how do you explain change observed in
> the
> > world.
>
> I think the idea is that change is difference between moments. They need
> not
> have duration if instead that contain a pointer or relation that defines a
> sequence of moments which we perceive as the flow of time. This seems to
> me to
> be closer to a theoretical physics idea of time than a pychological model.
>
> If change is to be included in the "observer moment", why does the
> > moment have to have finite duration at all? Could it not be
> semi-infinite?
> > (or a least a lifetime - whatever that is). Unless there is some
> "Groundhog
> > day" scenario (from the movie of that name, where Tom Hanks gets trapped
> into
> > living the same day over and over again),
>
> It was Bill Murray.
>
> surely in this case we get back to
> > my picture of the (quantum) history being the primordial object. Time is
> a
> > psychological entity. I have no problem with this. If one accepts Bruno
> > Marchal's conclusion, Physics and Psychology are ontologically reversed.
> All
> > physical concepts are fundamentally psychological phenomena. I suspect
> that
> > this conclusion actually follows from the Plenitude + Anthropic
> Principle,
> > without the need of some of Bruno's strong AI type assumptions, but that
> > remains to be seen.
>
> Bertrand Russell showed that time as a continuum could be constructed from
> finite perceived intervals. The ordering relation is given by the overlap
> of
> the intervals. It seems to me that these discussions are sometimes
> confused as
> to whether the argument is going to take a Cartesian direction from
> something
> we perceive directly -- "there is a thought" -- to the apparent physical
> world
> or instead to assume some Platonic ideal --- the ensemble of all logically
> possible worlds -- and try to show that it makes us and our world at least
> probable. These are both interesting approaches and need not contradict;
> but
> it gets muddle when one slides from one to the other.
>
> Brent Meeker


------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The information contained in this e-mail message is confidential and may be privileged.
It is intended only for the use of the individual or entity named above. If the reader
of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or agent responsible to
deliver it to the intended recipient, this message must not be copied or distributed to
any other person. If you have received this message in error, please notify the sender
by telephone (+44-20-7337-3500) and destroy the original message. The Gerrard Group reserves
the right to monitor all e-mail messages passing through its network.

This e-mail originates from the Gerrard Group unless otherwise stated. The Gerrard Group
is regulated by SFA and is a member of the London Stock Exchange.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Received on Tue May 16 2000 - 04:37:20 PDT