It sounds like I was misunderstanding you again. It appears that you
are identifying our "physical" universe with the "concrete" universe
supporting the UD.
How I interpreted LITTLENESS was that the underlying formal structure
had too few axioms to allow a UD to be implemented. Since Turing
completeness* is sufficient for implementing UD, and since our
"physical" universe is Turing complete, it appeared to me that any
underlying formal system implementing our universe must also be Turing
complete.
I didn't think resource issues came into it.
Cheers
*I'm not entirely sure if this is the correct term for a formal system
to be able to implement a universal Turing machine.
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote :
>
> >However, surely LITTLENESS is contradicted by observation. We live in
> >a universe big enough to run the UD. Or have I missed something here?
>
>
> We live in a universe big enough to run a piece of the UD*, sure. To run
> the whole (infinite) UD*, though, the universe should expand infinitely
> with infinite creation of space/time, probably energy and all this in a
> very robust way to keep track of the computations.
>
> Not only that is not obvious to infer from observations, but if comp is
> correct that is absolutely undecidable.
>
> Of course LITTLENESS is the opposite of the everything or the plenitude
> hypothesis.
>
> I'm going to Dubrovnik now, so I'm not here for the next two weeks,
>
> Bye, Bruno
>
>
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Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Thu Apr 06 2000 - 16:31:01 PDT