On 28 xxx -1, Marchal wrote:
> Jacques Mallah wrote:
> >> I will not believe that you don't see the
> >> difference between Jacques Mallah *as* the person Jacques Mallah
> >> (the one I'm talking to right now), and Jacques Mallah as an
> >> input to Gaia or the Universal Wave function.
> >
> > JM: I'd say the former is an implementation of a computation, while
> >the latter is a program.
>
> Words. You are neither. The implemention and the program are both
> 3-concepts. You are not even a number although *you* can survive
> through a number (with comp).
Whatever that's supposed to mean. My statement stands.
> > I understand that you don't take the measure to be proportional to
> >the number of copies. What I don't really know is why.
>
> I keep telling you that I *do* take into account the number of copies.
Maybe you take it into account, but regardless of how you describe
your views, it's clear that you don't take it to be directly proportional.
> This is even why I must take into account the infinite number of copies
> of 3-myself-state (here and now) the UD will generates, when I compute
> (in principle) my expectation. The 1-white rabbit problem comes from
> the fact that the UD generates also an infinite number of
> 3-myself+3-or-1-rabbits. The 1-mesure problem, we could say.
I see only 1 WR problem and it's not the 1-WR, but the WR, which
is more or less solved.
> > What I must explain is my now-experience. It is plausibly one of
> >many experiences that exist, both similar and at different times, and less
> >similar and in different people.
>
> OK.
Well, if you agree with that statement it's a major admission on
your part. From now on you're not allowed to claim that linkage of
experiences over time is a problem or the like.
> >> > There's no difference between those two things.
> >>
> >> where the two things were a) an infinitely long program
> >> b) a short program + an infinitely long input.
> >>
> >> But here too I AGREE with you! You should really read more
> >> carefully my posts before answering :-).
> >
> > This seems inconsistent with your earlier remarks re: Windows
> >98. If you agree that input is the same as part of the program, let's
> >banish the word input from now on.
>
> The program is determinate. The input perhaps also, but perhaps not so!
> the input is relatively indeterminate. You cannot banish it (cf UDA).
A UD has no input. In any case it's always possible to consider
"input" as part of the program. If it's 'random' one has a distribution
of programs.
> >> Let me ask you a question:
> >> Suppose that either:
> >>
> >> 1) You are anesthetized, cooled, scanned, annihilated at A, and the
> >> information is send at B, where you are reconstituted.
> >>
> >> 2) or You are anesthetized, cooled, scanned, annihilated at A, and the
> >> information is send at B and C. At B you are reconstituted, but at C the
> >> information is destroyed.
> >>
> >> 3) or You are anesthetized and put in the Schroedinger-cat's box.
> >>
> >> >From an older post of you I can infer that you believe you will survive
> >> with certainty to 1). Will you survive with certainty 2) ?
> >> And, in that case, why will you not survive 3) ?
> >
> > In case 1), for all practical purposes, I would survive.
> > Case 2) is identical to case 1).
> > In case 3), 2n copies of me go in and only n copies come out. For
> >all practical purposes, that's like having a 50% chance to be killed.
>
> Mmh ..., still the differentiate MW Interpretation, in the comp
> realm. (cf the Q19 in Price's Everett FAQ).
No. First, there is no need to link the copies over time for my
statement to be valid. All the copies could be different. My statement
follows automatically if we agree the number of copies is proportional to
the measure.
Second, I take the number of implementations to be what
counts. You can consider these linked over time if you want, it doesn't
really matter. By my hypothesis that the measure can be derived that way,
then for 50% of the allowed mappings from physical (wavefunction) to
formal states, the physical state will go "out of bounds" thus ending that
particular implementation of the computation, while it will continue to be
implemented for the rest of the mappings.
BTW I have previously derided the 'FAQ'.
> > 4) Being copied - is the opposite of case 3).
>
> With the differentiate MW Interpretation, of course.
> One day you will tell me why you believe in that stuff.
>
> > You might not be
> >aware of it, or each copy might be labeled 1 and 2.
>
> ?
It doesn't matter if the 1-experience divides or not.
> > 5) Suppose you measure a spin that has a 50% chance to be
> >up. There is no copying or killing, but there are now two types of you,
> >up seeing and down seeing. That has no effect on your total measure in my
> >view because each type has half the original measure; it's not like
> >copying.
>
> And then there is no splitting at all, only fusing. To be honest I don't
> know. Where does these parallel computations come from. And even in this
> case, to be mortal you need a finite number of those parallel
> computations.
> All that seems to me rather ad hoc and conceptually heavy (poor Occam).
> That is a big price for `staying mortal'.
As usual you don't understand much. To be mortal, the expectation
value over the measure distribution (of observer-moments) for your age
must be finite, that's all.
- - - - - - -
Jacques Mallah (jqm1584.domain.name.hidden)
Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate
"I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum
My URL:
http://pages.nyu.edu/~jqm1584/
Received on Fri Mar 03 2000 - 13:39:32 PST