Re: on simply being an SAS (and UDA)

From: Marchal <>
Date: Mon Feb 28 02:53:48 2000

Jacques Mallah wrote:

>On 22 Mar -1, Marchal wrote:
>> Jacques Mallah wrote:
>>> One could regard Windows 98 as a program,
>>> or as input to the more basic program of the CPU; it's an artificial
>>> distinction.
>> BM: Perhaps for the 3-person point of view. Trivialy idiotic from the
>> 1-person point of view. I will not believe that you don't see the
>> difference between Jacques Mallah *as* the person Jacques Mallah
>> (the one I'm talking to right now), and Jacques Mallah as an
>> input to Gaia or the Universal Wave function.
> JM: I'd say the former is an implementation of a computation, while
>the latter is a program.

Words. You are neither. The implemention and the program are both
3-concepts. You are not even a number although *you* can survive
through a number (with comp).

> I understand that you don't take the measure to be proportional to
>the number of copies. What I don't really know is why.

I keep telling you that I *do* take into account the number of copies.
This is even why I must take into account the infinite number of copies
of 3-myself-state (here and now) the UD will generates, when I compute
(in principle) my expectation. The 1-white rabbit problem comes from
the fact that the UD generates also an infinite number of
3-myself+3-or-1-rabbits. The 1-mesure problem, we could say.

> What I must explain is my now-experience. It is plausibly one of
>many experiences that exist, both similar and at different times, and less
>similar and in different people.


>> > There's no difference between those two things.
>> where the two things were a) an infinitely long program
>> b) a short program + an infinitely long input.
>> But here too I AGREE with you! You should really read more
>> carefully my posts before answering :-).
> This seems inconsistent with your earlier remarks re: Windows
>98. If you agree that input is the same as part of the program, let's
>banish the word input from now on.

The program is determinate. The input perhaps also, but perhaps not so!
the input is relatively indeterminate. You cannot banish it (cf UDA).

>> I was talking about a short program/state (think about a state of
>> your artificial digital body existing with comp) relatively
>> to an indetermined (infinitely long) computation. That indetermined
>> (infinitely long) computation looks more like a *set* of
>> (infinitely long) computations.
> That sounds more like a short program, like the UD, that
>implements various other programs. But I don't see your point here.

It is unlike the UD. Which is a little program without input. It is like
a little program embedded in the UD. The actual 3-you (the computational
state of your brain if you prefer) in front of all 3-you possible
computational continuations (arithmeticaly existing in UD*) 1-infer by
the possible and numerous 1-you.

>> By all your distinction-blurring you dissolve problems.
>> That old sort of trick does not solves problems.
> It's hard to rhyme 'problems', but once again you're
>cheating. The line-1 word is the same as the line-2 word.

I always forget you are a poet.

>> >From your URL it seems to me you are aware of the mind-body problem,
>> but like some physicist (BTW Congratulation!), you are still
>> trying to put the mind under the carpet.
> No, I'm just keeping track of the numbers of minds.

It seems interesting, and it does look to what I try to do too.
(Now try to find a rhyme to ``to do too" !)

>> Let me ask you a question:
>> Suppose that either:
>> 1) You are anesthetized, cooled, scanned, annihilated at A, and the
>> information is send at B, where you are reconstituted.
>> 2) or You are anesthetized, cooled, scanned, annihilated at A, and the
>> information is send at B and C. At B you are reconstituted, but at C the
>> information is destroyed.
>> 3) or You are anesthetized and put in the Schroedinger-cat's box.
>> >From an older post of you I can infer that you believe you will survive
>> with certainty to 1). Will you survive with certainty 2) ?
>> And, in that case, why will you not survive 3) ?
> In case 1), for all practical purposes, I would survive.
> Case 2) is identical to case 1).
> In case 3), 2n copies of me go in and only n copies come out. For
>all practical purposes, that's like having a 50% chance to be killed.

Mmh ..., still the differentiate MW Interpretation, in the comp
realm. (cf the Q19 in Price's Everett FAQ).

> 4) Being copied - is the opposite of case 3).

With the differentiate MW Interpretation, of course.
One day you will tell me why you believe in that stuff.

> You might not be
>aware of it, or each copy might be labeled 1 and 2.


> 5) Suppose you measure a spin that has a 50% chance to be
>up. There is no copying or killing, but there are now two types of you,
>up seeing and down seeing. That has no effect on your total measure in my
>view because each type has half the original measure; it's not like

And then there is no splitting at all, only fusing. To be honest I don't
know. Where does these parallel computations come from. And even in this
case, to be mortal you need a finite number of those parallel
All that seems to me rather ad hoc and conceptually heavy (poor Occam).
That is a big price for `staying mortal'.

Received on Mon Feb 28 2000 - 02:53:48 PST

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