Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2009 19:52:41 +0200

On 16 Sep 2009, at 17:25, Flammarion wrote:

>
>
>
> On 16 Sep, 15:51, "m.a." <marty....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> the ocean of virtual particles which may give
>> rise to all "real" particles exists somewhere between matter and
>> thought.
>
> I see no reason to believe that
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_particle


You are quite quick on this.

There is a tradition in quantum mechanics , with von Neumann, Wigner,
Walker, Penrose, and in a sense Heisenberg, Pauli, Fuchs, ... to
ascribe to consciousness the ability to collapse the wave, in this
case field superpostion of number operator states (in the vaccuum, say).
This made essentially the (universal) state function into a (relative)
knowledge state.

Of course Everettian, a fortioti computationalists, take the indexical
view so that they associate the knowledge state with some self-
localisation in a multiverse. This can save the knower and the known
thing. They do that by realism with respect to the terms used in the
language of their theories.

Comp provides an explanation where those operators come from
'elementary arithmetic seen from inside), and this in a way which
respects the absolute existence of the person and its private
experience *and* the stability and *partial* sharability and
computability of the appearances. And it predicts the indeterminacies
beyond. All that double aspect is explained through the Gödel-Löb-
Solovay spliiting between provabilities (and intensional variants) and
truth (about them).

I think you miss the idea entirely. It is because I don't want to be
involved in philosophical issue, that I decided to assume the
computationnalist hypothesis so as to translate the mind-body problem
into a problem of computer science.

Machine theology is the study of the difference between truth and what
machine can prove, observe, intuit and infer. You can interpret this
formally, if this is how you look at mathematics.

AUDA is UDA, for the formalists. Instead of asking *you* to do a
thought experiment, I interview a universal machine through the use of
its 'guardian angels' G and G*.

You postpone the thought experience since the beginning, you may as
well focus on the fromal math instead. Machine's theology defines its
own physics, and it makes 'formal comp' testable, and that's the point.

The least comp does, is to show we can be rationalist and have a
conception of reality far nearer to Plato, Plotinus, and many other
school in the east, than to Aristotle's primary materialism (shared by
some atheists and some christians).

But are you able to doubt the existence of primary matter? To conceive
another religion or reality conception?

Your unwillingness to search for an error in the argument makes me
infer that you may be unable to doubt the existence of primary matter.
Or are you?

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Received on Wed Sep 16 2009 - 19:52:41 PDT

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