2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
>
>
>
> On 16 Sep, 16:02, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 16 Sep, 14:58, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>
> >
> > > > > On 16 Sep, 13:49, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>
> >
> > > > > > > On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > > > > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>
> >
> > > > > > > > > On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden>
> wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
> >
> > > > > > > > > > >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is
> > > supposed
> > > > > to be
> > > > > > > > > > >> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers
> > > existing
> > > > > > > > > > >> Platonically, other than that different labels are
> being
> > > used.
> > > > > > > What
> > > > > > > > > > >> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the
> former
> > > > > does
> > > > > > > not,
> > > > > > > > > > >> and what difference is this supposed to make? Can you
> > > help,
> > > > > > > Peter?
> >
> > > > > > > > > > > Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal
> > > meaning.
> > > > > > > > > > > Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 07 exists,
> > > > > > > > > > > since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter
> think
> > > > > > > > > > > 7 has Platonic existence.
> >
> > > > > > > > > > Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word
> > > 'ontological'
> > > > > > > > > > makes in this context. Surely whatever world-conjuring
> power
> > > > > numbers
> > > > > > > > > > may possess can't depend on which label is attached to
> them?
> >
> > > > > > > > > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
> > > > > > > > > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
> > > > > > > > > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
> > > > > > > > > "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that
> > > > > > > > > makes the label-attachment correct.
> >
> > > > > > > > > > If a
> > > > > > > > > > mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory
> role (a
> > > > > moot
> > > > > > > > > > point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
> >
> > > > > > > > > If you are claiming that the *existence* of numbers
> > > > > > > > > would explain somehting empierica;, that is an abductive
> > > > > > > > > argument for Platonism. Other than that sayign "Numbers
> > > > > > > > > explain" is too vague. Numbers are often used to
> > > > > > > > > explain things about other numbers. So what,
> > > > > > > > > says the formalist, none of them exist and such
> > > > > > > > > explanations are nothing but moves in a game.
> >
> > > > > > > > Well if it's a game how do you explain it fits observation ?
> >
> > > > > > > Much of it doesn't.
> >
> > > > > > > >How do you
> > > > > > > > explain the predictability of physical theories (which are
> *only*
> > > > > numbers
> > > > > > > > based) ?
> >
> > > > > > > They are a subset of maths which does fit obeserved
> regularities.
> > > > > > > Discarded theorie are another subset of maths that doesn't.
> > > > > > > The Library of Babel contains history as well as fiction.
> Think
> > > about
> > > > > > > it.
> >
> > > > > > That wasn't what I wanted to convey... please note the "which are
> > > *only*
> > > > > > numbers based".
> >
> > > > > At best that suggests that only the mathematical structures
> > > > > exemplified
> > > > > by correct physics exist (mathematical empriicsm rather than
> Platonism
> > > > > or Formalism).
> >
> > > > Why "at best" ?
> >
> > > Because phsyics containst false theories as well as true ones. If
> > > all mathematical structures existed, that would not be the case.
> >
> > Well unless you could observe everything and then rightfully assert that
> > exist, that doesn't, you can't be sure that theories alla Tegmark are
> false.
>
> If Tegmark is correct. there are no false physical theories.
>
> But you can't justify Tegmarkism by appealing to a Tegmarkian
> conception of physcis -- that is circular.
>
Well, likewise you can't justify PM by appealing to a PM conception of
physics.
>
> > But anyway i do not follow your "at best"... your "at best" is whishful
> > thinking. By saying it you are commiting yourself to the PM theorie...
> which
> > is metaphysical.
>
> It's no more metaphysical than Platonism or Tegmarkism.
>
Sure, I was only pointing that your answer commit to PM theorie and that is
metaphysical (as platonism or "tegmarkism" is of course).
Regards,
Quentin
>
>
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Received on Wed Sep 16 2009 - 18:39:12 PDT