Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

From: Brent Meeker <meekerdb.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2009 09:33:41 -0700

David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>
>>> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
>>> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
>>> Platonically, other than that different labels are being used. What
>>> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former does not,
>>> and what difference is this supposed to make? Can you help, Peter?
>>>
>> Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal meaning.
>> Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 07 exists,
>> since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter think
>> 7 has Platonic existence.
>>
>
> Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word 'ontological'
> makes in this context. Surely whatever world-conjuring power numbers
> may possess can't depend on which label is attached to them? If a
> mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory role (a moot
> point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
>
> David
Sure. There are different models of the world. Each model takes some
things as existing and tries to explain the rest in terms of relations,
processes, interactions, or whatever. The Standard Model takes quarks
and leptons and does a pretty impressive job of explaining everything
but gravity and consciousness (which is probably what inspired Penrose
to try to explain mind in terms of gravity). String theory tries to
explain both particles and gravity in terms of strings (or branes); but
it has it's own 'white rabbit' problem. Bruno wants to take arithemetic
as basic. But so far I don't see that his theory has predicted (as
opposed to retrodicted) anything except that it has a white rabbit
problem too. The discussion seems to have gotten stuck on whether it
has been proven that physics can't be fundamental because it can't
include consciousness. I consider that a diversion. Since we don't
really have a definite idea of what consciousness is let's see what the
theory does tell us - then we can worry about where physics fits.

Brent

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Received on Wed Sep 16 2009 - 09:33:41 PDT

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