Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

From: Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2009 14:49:33 +0200

2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>

>
>
>
> On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
> >
> > > > >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
> > > > >> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
> > > > >> Platonically, other than that different labels are being used.
> What
> > > > >> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former does
> not,
> > > > >> and what difference is this supposed to make? Can you help,
> Peter?
> >
> > > > > Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal meaning.
> > > > > Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 07 exists,
> > > > > since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter think
> > > > > 7 has Platonic existence.
> >
> > > > Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word 'ontological'
> > > > makes in this context. Surely whatever world-conjuring power numbers
> > > > may possess can't depend on which label is attached to them?
> >
> > > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
> > > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
> > > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
> > > "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that
> > > makes the label-attachment correct.
> >
> > > > If a
> > > > mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory role (a moot
> > > > point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
> >
> > > If you are claiming that the *existence* of numbers
> > > would explain somehting empierica;, that is an abductive
> > > argument for Platonism. Other than that sayign "Numbers
> > > explain" is too vague. Numbers are often used to
> > > explain things about other numbers. So what,
> > > says the formalist, none of them exist and such
> > > explanations are nothing but moves in a game.
> >
> > Well if it's a game how do you explain it fits observation ?
>
> Much of it doesn't.
>
> >How do you
> > explain the predictability of physical theories (which are *only* numbers
> > based) ?
>
> They are a subset of maths which does fit obeserved regularities.
> Discarded theorie are another subset of maths that doesn't.
> The Library of Babel contains history as well as fiction. Think about
> it.
>

That wasn't what I wanted to convey... please note the "which are *only*
numbers based".

Regards,
Quentin Anciaux


>
> >
>


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Received on Wed Sep 16 2009 - 14:49:33 PDT

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