Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

From: Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2009 05:45:42 -0700 (PDT)

On 16 Sep, 13:30, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > > 2009/9/16 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
>
> > > >> I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be
> > > >> between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing
> > > >> Platonically, other than that different labels are being used. What
> > > >> precisely is the latter supposed to entail that the former does not,
> > > >> and what difference is this supposed to make? Can you help, Peter?
>
> > > > Existing mathematically doesn't have any ontoloigcal meaning.
> > > > Both formalists and Platonists can agree that 07 exists,
> > > > since they agree Ex:x=7 is true, but only the latter think
> > > > 7 has Platonic existence.
>
> > > Yes, but I still don't see what difference the word 'ontological'
> > > makes in this context. Surely whatever world-conjuring power numbers
> > > may possess can't depend on which label is attached to them?
>
> > The knowabilitry of a claim about what powers numbers
> > have can only depend on what labels are correctly attached.
> > Petrol is not flammable just becaue I attached the label
> > "flammable" to it. Petrol *Is* flammable, and that
> > makes the label-attachment correct.
>
> > > If a
> > > mathematical scheme fulfils a deep enough explanatory role (a moot
> > > point I admit) isn't that 'ontological' enough?
>
> > If you are claiming that the *existence* of numbers
> > would explain somehting empierica;, that is an abductive
> > argument for Platonism. Other than that sayign "Numbers
> > explain" is too vague. Numbers are often used to
> > explain things about other numbers. So what,
> > says the formalist, none of them exist and such
> > explanations are nothing but moves in a game.
>
> Well if it's a game how do you explain it fits observation ?

Much of it doesn't.

>How do you
> explain the predictability of physical theories (which are *only* numbers
> based) ?

They are a subset of maths which does fit obeserved regularities.
Discarded theorie are another subset of maths that doesn't.
The Library of Babel contains history as well as fiction. Think about
it.

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Received on Wed Sep 16 2009 - 05:45:42 PDT

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