On 02 Sep 2009, at 19:35, 1Z wrote:
> Yablo on Quine <...>
> Yablo argues that each aspect of Quine's critique is flawed. Firstly,
> one does not need to hold that rules making up a linguistic framework
> are analytic in order to be able to understand the need for a
> framework in order to understand the meaning of terms. Not really sure
> how this fits in and is related to Quine's second objection stage: One
> does not need to render external talk of the objects within a
> particular framework meaningless in order to save the internal, rule-
> bound meaning. One can just make clear how such external statements
> cannot be applied internally.;finally, Yablo points out that Quine
> himself accepts the fact that a statement can be asserted purely for
> practical advantage without the asserter actually holding that what it
> entails metaphysically is actually the case.
>
> Saving the Framework
> Yablo goes on to propose a linguistic framework modified in light of
> Quine's criticisms in which a framework is adopted as a kind of "game"
> where the players assess the truth and falsity of statements within
> the framework without any belief in implications for truth and/or
> falsity outside of the framework. Thus Yablo argues that there are two
> ways in which a statement may be interpreted: literally (external to a
> particular game or linguistic framework) or as a metaphor (internal).
>
> The Framework Strikes Back
> This distinction regarding the way in which a statement may be
> interpreted causes problems for the Quinean ontological regime. Given
> that Quine does accept that assertions may be made in a metaphorical
> sense, and that when one does so no ontological implications may be
> drawn from such assertions, Quine needs to provide a clear demarcation
> criterion to distinguish between metaphorical and literal statements.
> As this has been much discussed without progress, it seems unlikely
> that one will be able to distinguish between metaphorical and literal
> usage and thus it is impossible to construct a certain ontology under
> Quine's approach.
>
> Indeed, Yablo argues that for the most part when we make statements,
> we are unsure as to whether they are strictly literally true or if
> they are at least in part to be taken metaphorically. Thus the
> Quiniean must argue that in time these metaphorical parts of our
> statements will be eroded and eventually only the literal
> interpretation will remain.
Number theory and computer science, and life, illustrates that the
contrary happens.
Quine's view on ontology disallow the modal contexts, that is the
person views, but as Boolos said provability logics provide a Qiuine-
acceptable view on the modalities/views. By incompleteness, essence
are unavoidable for the sound machines.
> However, this reduces the Quinean position
> to the following: one should sympathise with the idea that Xs exist
> iff the literal part of theories involve their postulation and one
> should count the part of a theory that involves the postulation of Xs
> literal iff there turn out to be Xs. Thus there is a circularity.
>
> Argument Outline
>
> * Carnap proposes a conception of linguistic practice (involving
> an internal/external distinction) under which ontological
> investigations cannot meaningfully be undertaken.
>
> * Quine criticises this by linking it to the problems of the
> analytic/synthetic distinction.
>
> * Yablo modifies Carnap's position so that the distinction is made
> on metaphorical/literal grounds in instead.
>
> * This new position requires that the Quinean provide a principle
> of demarcation between metaphor and literal truth in order for their
> ontology to prevail.
>
> * No such principle has been provided and so the Quinean
> ontological project fails.
CT entails it is easy to provide such a demarcation. The literal truth
are the true arithmetical sentences (in the Tarski sense.
The metaphor are the arithmetical sentences related to the discourses
and silence of universal numbers observing themselves, and (in most
UD-"time", betting on their most probable local universal computations.
There are many other possible demarcations. CT entails the equivalence
of a large class of such demarcation.
A physicalist demarcation is conceivable too. The literal truth could
be state of the universal wave function, or state of universal quantum
object (like Freedman Kitaev functor). The metaphor are given then by
emerging higher level relative classical (notably) beliefs.
There is already an explanation how bits emerges from qubits, (Everett
---> Zurek)
Only, if comp is true, the arrow has a reverse: we have to explain how
qubits emerge from bits (by UDA). The reverse arrow enriches the
picture a lot. By the Solovay splitting, we get both the communicable
quanta and the sensible and incommunicable qualia. At least, for the
formalist, we get sincere (by construction/restriction) discourses by
universal machines about themselves, and their possible views. That's
in the AUDA. This provides a formal (à-la Plotinus) 'theology'. For
non-comp, it is at least a 'toy' theology. Apparently valid and
complete (at the propositional level!) for all the sound axiomatizable
extensions of Peano Arithmetic, and sound for all the sound extensions
(don't need to be axiomatizable).
Instead of metaphor I would talk on emerging relative belief states.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Thu Sep 03 2009 - 21:01:16 PDT