On 1 Sep, 17:57, Brent Meeker <meeke....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> First, as I understand it, MGA shows that computation realizing
> consciousness could be instantiated with almost zero physical
> component. Since a reductio argument only entails that something in the
> inferences or premises is wrong, it is not shown that consciousness can
> be realized by computation in Platonia.
No, indeed not. But recall that the whole shebang *starts* on the
assumption of CTM being true. The reductio shows that something is
indeed wrong with the standard premiss that it can in fact be true
under the simultaneous assumption of PM. If one is wedded to the
notion that computation is incomprehensible without PM, then in the
face of this one has the option of abandoning CTM as incoherent for
that reason, which is essentially what I've been accustomed to
conclude. But Bruno points out the option of retaining CTM at the
cost of PM; then these very weird consequences are in fact logically
entailed, to the best of my belief. No-one said it wasn't counter-
intuitive.
> Of course then Bruno challenges us to point to
> the particular step of his argument that is in error. I suspect it has
> to do with the context or environment and the error is in supposing that
> consciousness can be separated from interaction with an external world.
> We're pretty sure that it can be for short periods of time, but as I
> recall from sensory deprivation experiments in the '70s consciousness
> goes into an endless loop after about an hour without input. I'm not
> sure what the implications of this are for computationalism. It
> certainly still allows that one might say "Yes." to the doctor. But it
> may invalidate the idea that the world is just conscious computations in
> Platonia because the world in total is probably not computable.
Yes, this is the crux of the matter, because to be true CTM would have
to justify the claim that the entire universe is in fact both
virtualisable and virtualised, which I take to be the point of the
constructive proof of the UD. Else saying yes to any doctors would be
dangerous indeed. But this again, if the reductio goes through, is an
entailment of 'standard' CTM; it just escapes recognition in the usual
understanding.
David
> David Nyman wrote:
> > 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
>
> >>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
> >>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
> >>> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
> >>> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
> >>> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
>
> >> No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting
> >> forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated
> >> on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low
> >> likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me
> >> to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is
> >> real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish
> >> between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge.
>
> > Well, the either the Olympia/MGA reductios entail this consequence, or
> > they don't. You imply that they don't, but you still haven't put
> > forward a clear refutation in a fully explicit form that could be
> > considered here on its merits. Until you can do this, it isn't a
> > question of certain or good-enough knowledge, but rather about the
> > logical entailment of CTM itself.
>
> First, as I understand it, MGA shows that computation realizing
> consciousness could be instantiated with almost zero physical
> component. Since a reductio argument only entails that something in the
> inferences or premises is wrong, it is not shown that consciousness can
> be realized by computation in Platonia. And, second, even if that were
> shown it would not follow that consciousness *is* realized by
> computation in Platonia. Of course then Bruno challenges us to point to
> the particular step of his argument that is in error. I suspect it has
> to do with the context or environment and the error is in supposing that
> consciousness can be separated from interaction with an external world.
> We're pretty sure that it can be for short periods of time, but as I
> recall from sensory deprivation experiments in the '70s consciousness
> goes into an endless loop after about an hour without input. I'm not
> sure what the implications of this are for computationalism. It
> certainly still allows that one might say "Yes." to the doctor. But it
> may invalidate the idea that the world is just conscious computations in
> Platonia because the world in total is probably not computable.
>
> Which is not to say I don't find Bruno's argument interesting as a
> possible model of the multiverse. If QM can be based on a UD that
> would be very interesting.
>
> Brent
>
> > This is an extremely non-trivial
> > point: the burden of the argument is that CTM entails a reversal in
> > world-view; it is fundamentally incompatible with a materialist
> > metaphysics.
>
> >> BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of
> >> a smaller material universe?
>
> > That is a tenable view. But not with the simultaneous assumption of
> > CTM. That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
> > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
> > on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me to
> > the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
> > be founded on CTM
>
> > David
>
> >> On 1 Sep, 11:09, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> >>> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden>:
>
> >>>>> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
> >>>>> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
> >>>>> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>
> >>>> Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
> >>>> that we are 1 level deep, 02 levels deep... in a virtualisation.
>
> >>>> Real reality is the simplest assumption
>
> >>> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
> >>> follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the
> >>> basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on
> >>> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
> >>> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
>
> >> No, none of that follows from CTM alone. Bruno is putting
> >> forward the Sceptical Hypothesis that I am being simulated
> >> on a UD. However, if I am entiteld to assign a very low
> >> likelihood to that SH along with all the many others, alowing me
> >> to know in a good-enough way that matter is real, reality is
> >> real etc. It is very important in these arguments to distinguish
> >> between certain knowledge and good-enough knowledge.
>
> >> BTW--why doens't O's R cut away Platonia in favour of
> >> a smaller material universe?
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 11:41:44 PDT