David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>
>> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
>> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
>> physics.
>>
>
> It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
> argument is against CTM+PM. AFAICS nobody is claiming that the
> assumption of CTM is *forced* by the computability of physics,
> although the contrary would of course argue against it. Rather, *once
> CTM is assumed* the entailment on the basis of UDA-8 is that PM is
> false, or at best superfluous. If we can't get past this point, we're
> doomed to go round in circles.
>
>
>> The CTM does indeed have hypotetical implciations about
>> virtualisation, but nothing follows from that. There is no
>> implication from "I might be virtualised" to "I am virtualised" any
>> more than from "I might be BIV.."
>>
>
> On the contrary, the insight that Bruno points out is that the force
> of CTM consists precisely in the *assumption* that "I am virtualised";
> else it has no force. This is the point. UDA-8 is then designed to
> expose the entailment that "my generalised environment is virtualised"
> is thereby also forced. Consequently the CTM is forced to be a theory
> of mind-body, or else nothing.
How did we get from a hypothetical that "I am virtualised" to something
being *forced*? This is like saying "I might be virtualised" entails "I
must be virtualised".
Brent
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 10:08:00 PDT