Re: Dreaming On

From: David Nyman <david.nyman.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 13:23:41 +0100

2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:

> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
> physics.

It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the
argument is against CTM+PM. AFAICS nobody is claiming that the
assumption of CTM is *forced* by the computability of physics,
although the contrary would of course argue against it. Rather, *once
CTM is assumed* the entailment on the basis of UDA-8 is that PM is
false, or at best superfluous. If we can't get past this point, we're
doomed to go round in circles.

> The CTM does indeed have hypotetical implciations about
> virtualisation, but nothing follows from that. There is no
> implication from "I might be virtualised" to "I am virtualised" any
> more than from "I might be BIV.."

On the contrary, the insight that Bruno points out is that the force
of CTM consists precisely in the *assumption* that "I am virtualised";
else it has no force. This is the point. UDA-8 is then designed to
expose the entailment that "my generalised environment is virtualised"
is thereby also forced. Consequently the CTM is forced to be a theory
of mind-body, or else nothing. This insight has replaced my previous
assessment that CTM was merely vacuous as a theory of mind. You
however have been non-committal as to the validity of CTM on the basis
of PM. What would it take to convince you one way or the other?

AFAICS in and of itself "I might be BIV" makes no explicit reference
to a theory of mind.

David

>
>
>
> On 1 Sep, 11:16, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> Exactly,
>> if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
>> is being simulated on "the level 0" of the real (if there is one).
>>
>> There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
>> machine running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine
>> running on this "level 0".
>>
>> Peter claims that level 00 is needed... but why ?
>
> I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough
> to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of
> physics.
>
>>If mind is
>> computation, level 0 plays no role in consciousness. If CTM is true, I
>> could run Peter with an abacus and that Peter would still forcelly
>> argues that HE IS ON LEVEL 0... which is totally untrue in that case.
>
> And if I were a wizard I could trapsort you to Narnia and make you
> believe you were still in France.
>
> The CTM does indeed have hypotetical implciations about
> virtualisation, but nothing follows from that. There is no
> implication from "I might be virtualised" to "I am virtualised" any
> more than from "I might be  BIV.."
> >
>

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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 13:23:41 PDT

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