On 1 Sep, 15:32, Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> If there is nothing at the bottom
> of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
Yes, it sounds logically compelling when you put it like that, doesn't
it? But the entailment of CTM - and this is why it's so important for
you to clarify your objections to this - is that there is nothing that
can be said about "the bottom of the stack" that is not vacuous with
respect to computational theory. CTM forces us to face the issue of
the incompatibility of what we think we want out of an ontology, and
what we can actually get on the basis of a given theory. CTM forces
you - by Occam - to disregard any effects of a non-virtual ontology.
Beyond this, there's nothing to stop you making an additional claim
that it must nonetheless supervene on 'real matter' in order to be
really real. But in that case, after the application of the razor,
it's you who are invoking pixies.
If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with
it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I
would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept
it or refute it with precise counter-argument. Which is it to be?
> > Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
> > RITSIAR=platonic.
>
> CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
> I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
> that
> Possible X => actually X
> is a fallacy.
CTM does not only suggest this, it forces the conclusion, or else
collapses. Saying no to the doctor implies either that you distrust
his command of theory or praxis, or alternatively that you don't
believe in CTM - this is still your option. This is such a crucial
point that at this stage ISTM that it requires either clear acceptance
on the basis of truth, or clear refutation on the basis of error.
AFAICS these discussions are absolutely pointless on any other basis.
> > Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
> > virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous. But this is the
> > value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
> > choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
> > theoretical conjunctions.
>
> No incompatibility has been demonstrated.
Well, I and others have argued at some length that it has, and Bruno
in particular has argued with great precision that it has. The floor
is yours.
David
> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>
>
> > On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
> > > >That is the point. I should say that my starting position
> > > > before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of CTM on
> > > > the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno hasn't
> > > > yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
> > > > on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me to
> > > > the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can tenably
> > > > be founded on CTM
>
> > > coupled with Platonism.
>
> > With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point. What Bruno has
> > demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8
> > shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very
> > virtuality*. Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be vacuous.
>
> There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> If there is nothing at the bottom
> of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
>
> > Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
> > RITSIAR=platonic.
>
> CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
> I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
> that
> Possible X => actually X
> is a fallacy.
>
> > Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
> > virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous. But this is the
> > value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
> > choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
> > theoretical conjunctions.
>
> No incompatibility has been demonstrated.
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 08:32:31 PDT