Re: Dreaming On

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 17:32:00 +0200

On 01 Sep 2009, at 16:32, Flammarion wrote:

> On 1 Sep, 15:00, David Nyman <> wrote:
>> On 1 Sep, 13:08, Flammarion <> wrote:
>>>> That is the point. I should say that my starting position
>>>> before encountering Bruno's views was against the tenability of
>>>> CTM on
>>>> the basis of any consistent notion of physical process. Bruno
>>>> hasn't
>>>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of
>>>> mind
>>>> on some such basis is actually untenable. But he has awakened me
>>>> to
>>>> the reverse realisation that a non-materialist world-view can
>>>> tenably
>>>> be founded on CTM
>>> coupled with Platonism.
>> With respect, Peter, you continue to miss the point. What Bruno has
>> demonstrated is that CTM as a mind-body theory (which is what UDA-8
>> shows it must be) makes no ontological commitment *by its very
>> virtuality*. Or rather, any such commitment is shown to be vacuous.
> There's got to be somehting at the bottom of the stack. Bruno
> wants to substitue matetr with Platonia as the substrate.
> If there is nothing at the bottom
> of the stack, there are no virtualisations running higher up.
>> Consequently under CTM, one is committed to RITSIAR=virtual, not
>> RITSIAR=platonic.
> CTM only suggests that I *could* be virtualised. Alternatively
> I could be running on the metal. I do wish you guys would undertand
> that
> Possible X => actually X
> is a fallacy.

So you have a problem with the indexical approach of time, and space.
Of course it is the milk of the everything-list basic idea. And MGA,
certainly not just MGA, shows that comp entails the indexical
approach. Actually X is indeed just consistent X "as seen from inside".

>> Now, one obviously has the option *precisely in
>> virtue of this* to dismiss CTM as itself vacuous. But this is the
>> value of the insight: its force is to commit you to these explicit
>> choices, and hence to cease vacillating between incompatible
>> theoretical conjunctions.
> No incompatibility has been demonstrated.

Given the references to text and posts, we are still waiting a
justification of this statement.
A scientist would say: your going from this line to this line is
invalid for this reason.


> >

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at
Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 17:32:00 PDT

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:16 PST