2009/9/1 Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>:
>> Bruno hasn't
>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
>> on some such basis is actually untenable.
>
>
> I don't think I have ever said that.
No, you're right. However I was referring to the fact that you
sometimes attach certain, presumably in-your-view problematic,
entailments to it (see below).
> - Physicalism entails that any theory of mind should rely on actual
> big infinities
>
> The proof is constructive: CTM implies that physics, in all its
> precision, can be found in this way ..... (self-reference logic, etc.).
>
> But the proof can be indeed weakened. We have still the reversal with
> transfinite weakening of comp. Hypermachine, oracles, etc. does not
> change the result. To keep physicalism intact we need a mind close to
> being, not a god, but *the * God, if that is not inconsistent. Who
> knows? In that case, comp, or CTM, is false.
Does your comment above about "big infinities" and *the* God
correspond in any way to Plotinus's view of the One, or the poetic
idea that the universe is the "mind" of God? IOW that the context of
mind would have to encompass *everything physical* (however we might
express this in terms of current theory) rather than be based on some
definable computational subset such as AR? In this case, I guess
there might still be a way to recover the first-person "I" as
attachable to physically-differentiated viewpoints within such a
maximally generalised context. The WR problem might still be present
with a vengeance, depending on choice of QM interpretation, and in any
case current physicalist assumptions about mind IMO make light both of
persons and mental appearances. Is there some more-or-less coherent
way to characterise the dichotomies between CTM and physicalist
theories of mind on some such basis?
BTW, discussion of the strong entailment against PM as explanatory of
the appearance of matter within CTM is still stalled on Peter's
complaint that there has not been a clear demonstration of the
validity of the UDA-8 MGA/Olympia arguments. Is there anything
further that can be done to resolve this? I note that, in addition to
your own papers, there have been many extensive threads on this topic
on the list. Is there some way to summarise these that would aid the
situation, or do you perhaps feel that sufficient has been published
to place the burden of proof on the dissenter?
David
>
>
> On 01 Sep 2009, at 13:26, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> Bruno hasn't
>> yet persuaded me that an explicitly non-computational theory of mind
>> on some such basis is actually untenable.
>
>
> I don't think I have ever said that.
>
> All what I propose is a (constructive) proof of the following
> equivalent propositions:
>
> - CTM implies physics is a branch of computer science (alias machine
> theology, number theory, etc...)
> - CTM & Physicalism entails (constructively) that 00 = 1
> - Physicalism entails that any theory of mind should rely on actual
> big infinities
>
> The proof is constructive: CTM implies that physics, in all its
> precision, can be found in this way ..... (self-reference logic, etc.).
>
> But the proof can be indeed weakened. We have still the reversal with
> transfinite weakening of comp. Hypermachine, oracles, etc. does not
> change the result. To keep physicalism intact we need a mind close to
> being, not a god, but *the * God, if that is not inconsistent. Who
> knows? In that case, comp, or CTM, is false.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
>
> >
>
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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 13:52:11 PDT