Re: Dreaming On

From: David Nyman <>
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 11:19:27 +0100

2009/9/1 Flammarion <>:

Peter, I've considered whether anything is to be gained from my
responding further, and much as I regret coming to this conclusion, I
don't think we can make any further progress together on this topic.
If such were possible, I suspect it would require a great deal more
patience and willingness to consider world-views more comprehensively,
probably on both our parts, rather than reciprocal logic-chopping that
strikes me as fundamentally at cross-purposes.


> On 1 Sep, 00:09, David Nyman <> wrote:
>> 2009/8/31 Flammarion <>:
>> > That says nothing about qualia at all.
>> It would be helpful if we could deal with one issue at a time.  Most
>> of the passage you commented on was intended - essentially at your
>> provocation - as a contextual exploration of possible conditions for
>> recallable consciousness experience, not an explication of qualia per
>> se.
> But the context of the thread was you asking me about Chalmer's theory
> of intrinsic qualia. I answered that relevantly. You appear to have
> drifted off.
>> But you haven't commented on this.
> OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant
> specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained
> physically and not therefore part of the HP and not
> therefore of much philosophical interest.
>>  By the way, if you have a
>> simple extrinsic account of the phenomena of the specious present, I'd
>> be genuinely interested in more detail.
> I think I gave one. Slow communications in the brain=short term
> information storage=specious present
> You could hardly *not* have one.
>>As to qualia, I've said
>> before that I believe qualitative instantiation to be beyond extrinsic
>> explanation (though not beyond indirect reference) for the simple
>> reason that all explanation takes place in terms of it
> That couldn't be more wrong. Mathematical/structural/functional
> thinking
> is qualia-free, and the HP is the problem of recovering qualia from a
> description
> in those terms
>> (if you're
>> wondering what this means I trust a little introspection will
>> suffice).
> Done that, came to opposite conclusion.
>> > Do you think Chalmers suggestion that qualia are intrinsic properties
>> > of fundamental particles is feasible or not?
>> I doubt, despite standard usages suited to technical ends, that talk
>> of properties is helpful in this regard.
> Are you ever going to say what this problem with properties is?
>> There are fundamental
>> problems with any attempt to attach first-person consciousness to
>> matter,
> PM or material structures and processes?
>>for the obvious reason that matter cannot be reduced to
>> individually identifiable entities.
> PM or material structures and processes?
>> Consequently, the
>> self-referential "I" is attachable only contextually to some overall
>> schema in which fundamental differentiation - physical or otherwise
>> (e.g. 'computational') can then play a processual role.
> Can't matter have processes?
>> I've remarked
>> before that 'knowledge' must be regarded in the final analysis as
>> ontic - i.e. we *instantiate* what we know - the subject-object
>> distinction in mentality is merely a metaphor inferred from the
>> polarisation of roles.  When I've said this in other contexts you've
>> usually reacted with bewilderment, so if this still seems opaque
>> perhaps you could specify what is unclear.  Anyway, on this basis we
>> might think of qualitative instantiation as consisting in peculiarly
>> differentiated ways-of-being, as distinct from the unbroken symmetry
>> of the undifferentiated context.  As an aid to intuition, you could
>> think of this distinction in broadly similar terms to those you have
>> proposed for 'property-less' materiality as an enduring existential
>> substrate for extrinsic physical properties.
> Err yeah. How about you explain this property issue.
> >

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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 11:19:27 PDT

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