Re: Dreaming On

From: Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2009 12:16:55 +0200

Exactly,
if mind is a computational process, there is no way for it to know it
is being simulated on "the level 0" of the real (if there is one).

There would be *no difference* for it if it was simulated on virtual
machine running on a virtual machine running on a virtual machine
running on this "level 0".

Peter claims that level 00 is needed... but why ? If mind is
computation, level 0 plays no role in consciousness. If CTM is true, I
could run Peter with an abacus and that Peter would still forcelly
argues that HE IS ON LEVEL 0... which is totally untrue in that case.

Regards,
Quentin

2009/9/1 David Nyman <david.nyman.domain.name.hidden>:
>
> 2009/9/1 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>>> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
>>> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
>>> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>>
>> Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
>> that we are 1 level deep, 02 levels deep... in  a virtualisation.
>>
>> Real reality is the simplest assumption
>
> Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM
> follows on the *assumption* of CTM.  The razor is then applied on the
> basis of that assumption.  If you prefer a theory of mind based on
> "real reality", fair enough, but then you must face the conclusion
> that CTM is no longer tenable in that role.
>
> David
>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 1 Sep, 01:21, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>> On 31 Aug, 15:14, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>>>
>>> > I would not put AR on the same par as PM(*).
>>>
>>> > I know that Peter have problem with this, but AR does not commit you
>>> > ontologically. It is just the idea that arithmetical propositions are
>>> > either true or false.
>>>
>>> Yes, I think I finally understand your view on this.  It relies on the
>>> denial of CTM+PM as a theory of mind,
>>
>> I thought it was supposed to be a disproof
>>
>> Anyone can deny something
>>
>>> but does not thereby rule out
>>> the conceivability of a level of zero-virtuality supervening on PM.
>>> Rather it shows that, for any putative computational realisation of
>>> mind, any such attribution is both absolutely unknowable and causally
>>> irrelevant.
>>
>> I have argued that it is unknowable in the sense that
>> sceptical hypotheses sucha s the BIV are undisprovable,
>> We generally disregard them anyway,
>> since, for one thing, we would have no idea which to accept.
>>
>>
>>> This clearly unmasks any such notion of PM as a
>>> superfluous assumption with respect to CTM, and Occam consequently
>>> dictates that we discard it as any part of the theory.
>>
>> Au contraire, occam requires us to throw away the assumptions
>> that we are 1 level deep, 2 levels deep... in  a virtualisation.
>>
>> Real reality is the simplest assumption
>>
>>> IOW it is the
>>> prior assumption of CTM itself that drives the chain of inference, as
>>> you have always claimed.  And I further agree that *on the basis of
>>> CTM* it then follows that no meaning of 'exist' should be taken
>>> literally.  It is very much to your credit that you have laid bare
>>> these hidden implications of CTM, as I think they are central to most
>>> of the myriad confusions that surround it.  If people have a complaint
>>> about the implications, they cannot now dodge the fact that this
>>> disquiet is unavoidably entailed by CTM itself.
>>>
>>> David
>>
>> >
>>
>
> >
>



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Received on Tue Sep 01 2009 - 12:16:55 PDT

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