Re: AUH/MWI/UDA (Was: Everything is Just a Memory)

From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Wed Feb 9 02:36:46 2000

Alastair Malcolm wrote:

>> I simplify myself for clarity. It all depends on the level of
>> substitution.
>> If the level is very low we could have that
>>
>> COMP implies the existence of two moons around the earth.
>>
>> Now, apparently there is only one moon; so comp is false.
>>
>> That the level is so low is hardly plausible.
>
>Please forgive a few more very basic (and probably very stupid) questions,
>as I try to understand this:
>
>I have presumed that by low-level substitution you have been meaning digital
>substitution at around the atomic or molecular level, and by high level
>around the neural level (so a neuron is replaced by a complex algorithm,
>say). If that is a correct presumption, then why is low level substitution
>implausible? I would have thought that high level simulation of physics is
>*less* likely to be accurate, in general.

By low I mean not only that substitution must be done at the quark level
(let us say) but also that we must take into account the quantum non
separability (for exemple) and, for the sake of my argument, I was
imagining someone who belief that his 'brain' contains the moon (!).
Of course I consider that implausible. Cf my remarks about the
generalised brain in the UDA post. (Sorry for my unclearness).

>Also, I presume from your statement about deriving the logic of physical
>propositions from the UDA, that you mean *our* physics (rather than a
>spectrum of possible physical laws)?

It is *our* physics, with *our* = the SRC UTM (Self Referentially Correct
Universal Turing Machine).

> Is this physics derivation based on
>SAS-measures from the plenitude (of the UD), or something else, or is it
>entirely linked to deriving physical continuations *given* a SAS
>(/psychologically capable machine)?

It is, or should be, given (a priori) from the *relative* measure of the
computational continuations. 'Relative' means a sort of
conditionnalisation
on my actual computational state.
Universal prior could in this case explain the cosmological aspect of
our neighborhood (the stability of 'our past').

Bruno
Received on Wed Feb 09 2000 - 02:36:46 PST