On 22 Aug, 00:38, David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> On 21 Aug, 19:04, Flammarion <peterdjo....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>
>
>
> > > > Explaining away qua reduction is nto the same as
> > > > explaining away qua elimination.
>
> > > Well, either way he's explaining away, as you yourself point out
> > > below. But it's a false distinction, as I point out below.
>
> > > > > But also - just to dispose once and for all of this particular point -
> > > > > I want to be sure that you understand that I'm not arguing *for*
> > > > > eliminative materialism, except as devil's advocate (I'm sure you know
> > > > > this). But one aspect of my recent discussions with Peter has been to
> > > > > bring to a focus the strict consequences of materialism, in precisely
> > > > > the honest way that you attribute to Dennett. The trouble is, that
> > > > > Dennett, having eliminated the mind and hence the notorious 'problem',
> > > > > still cheerfully carries on deploying the same mind-dependent concepts
> > > > > as though nothing had happened!
>
> > > > The upshot of which is that he *hasn't* eliminated the mind
> > > > (with the possible exception of qualia)
> > > > in the sense of Eliminative Materialism, only reduced it in the
> > > > sense of Reductive materialism.
>
> > > What do you mean "with the possible exception of qualia"! The whole
> > > point is that if you think you can leave qualitative experience out of
> > > the account you're an eliminativist. Qualia are precisely what is
> > > being eliminated.
>
> > He is a selective eliminativist. He is not being
> > inconsistent. Having eiminated qualia, he deosn;t
> > continue to talk about them. He does continue to talk
> > about memory, thought and perception, but then he
> > hasn't eilminated them.
>
> > > > > In other words, his position is
> > > > > inconsistent and incoherent. It's dualism for free!
>
> > > > In other words, his position isn't what you have decided it is.
>
> > > What do you mean? Are you saying he's an eliminativist or a crypto-
> > > dualist? Or are you implying that (possibly!) non-qualitative
> > > reductive materialism is something different than either of these?
>
> > he is eliminativist about qualia and reductionist about everything
> > else.
>
> In that case he's an eliminativist about consciousness..
> > > > > So, in this context, let me try to understand your remark: "with or
> > > > > without assuming PM (primitive matter) there is an mathematical notion
> > > > > of computation and of computability". I would say - per Dennett, but
> > > > > understood *consistently* - that under the assumption that there is
> > > > > *only* primitive matter (i.e. material monism) - there strictly can be
> > > > > no appeal to such a notion as computation, because mathematics itself
> > > > > is eliminable per Qine.
>
> > > > No. Paraphrase indicates identity. Water can be paraphrased
> > > > as H2O. That means water is identical to H2O. not that
> > > > water does not and cannot exist. Water is only eliminated
> > > > as *fundamental* (eg. the way the Greeks thought of it).
> > > > EliminativISM is a much stronger claim, that the concept
> > > > eliminated should never subsequently be used even as
> > > > a place-holder or shrothand
>
> > > Yes, so following your recipe above, a given computation can be
> > > paraphrased as a specific physical process. This means that this
> > > computation is identical to that physical process. 'Computation' is
> > > therefore eliminated as something fundamental (in the Greek sense).
> > > Consequently, this leaves CTM+PM with 'computation' as a mere
> > > shorthand for an appeal to the fundamental physical processes, or
> > > alternatively with no appeal to anything fundamental whatsoever.
>
> > Yes, yes, and yes. Why would that be a problem?
>
> Well, if now you think there's no problem, perhaps you'd like to
> reconsider what you meant by "no" above. I try my best to respond to
> your comments, but it seems to me that you react as though you had
> never made them.
I mean it is false that:
"Under the assumption that there is
*only* primitive matter (i.e. material monism) - there strictly can be
no appeal to such a notion as computation,"
Because instances of compuitation are not eleiminated, they are
*identified*
with physical processes.
> > > Further, I can't possibly agree with your contention that
> > > 'eliminativism' is any other or stronger claim than this.
>
> > Uh-huh. And where are you getting your information
> > on eliminativism from?
>
> > >This would
> > > be absurd, as well as unnecessary, because it would mean that we would
> > > be struck dumb.
>
> > Only if we eliminated everything,. and only if we did not have
> > substitute theory. Elimiativists think terms like "thought" will
> > simply be abandoned as part of a failed theory,
> > (like "phlosgiston"), rather than continuing as convenient
> > but not entirely accurate shorthand. But they don't expect
> > this to happen until the replacement theories are
> > perfected. So they don't expect to be struck dumb.
>
> In that case they're 'replacementists' rather than 'eliminativists',
> wouldn't you say?
It doesn't help to re-arrange the vocabulary
>They just want to replace one shorthand with
> another.
No, they think that a final theory is final and not just
a shorthand for something else.
> Either way, talking in 'reducese' won't get you much
> conversation.
Why not?
> > > There is no problem with using the 'eliminated'
> > > concept as a shorthand (indeed this is explicitly proposed in the
> > > Quinean excerpt you commented).
>
> > Says who? Eliminativists argue that there is.
> > You may not agree, but you cannot conclude
> > that no-one holds those views.
>
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eliminativism
>
> >http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/
>
> Like I said, they just want to change the terminology.
The terminology did no pre-exist them. They get to define it.
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Received on Fri Aug 28 2009 - 05:40:53 PDT