On 28 Aug, 12:53, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> On 28 Aug 2009, at 10:52, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 28 Aug, 08:42, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >> On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> >>>> On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> >>>> But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are
> >>>> religious in
> >>>> the way they try to explain, or explain away the mind body
> >>>> problem. I
> >>>> can imagine that your consciousness supervene on something
> >>>> uncomputable in the universe. But we have not find anything
> >>>> uncomputable in the universe, except the quantum indeterminacy, but
> >>>> this is the kind of uncomputability predicted by the comp theory
> >>>> (and
> >>>> AUDA suggested it is exactly the uncomputable aspect of the
> >>>> universe
> >>>> predicted by comp).
>
> >>>> So you are postulating an unknown property of matter just to make
> >>>> the
> >>>> comp theory false. This is really a matter-of-the gaps (cf "god-of-
> >>>> the
> >>>> gaps") use of matter.
>
> >>> No uncomputable property is needed. If it is a fact that consc.
> >>> supervenes
> >>> directly on matter, then no immaterial machine or virtualisation can
> >>> be conscious.
>
> >> OK.
> >> But to be honest I have no clue what "matter" can be in that setting,
> >> nor what "directly" could possibly mean in "consciousness supervenes
> >> *directly* on matter".
> >> I think that you are saying or meaning that for a computation to have
> >> consciousness, the computation needs to be implemented in a "real
> >> material reality", but that is the point which MGA makes
> >> epistemologically inconsistant.
>
> >>> That does not prove CTM false, but it does disprove the argument
> >>> that
> >>> "if physics is computible, then the CTM is true"
>
> >> We have both "physics is computable" entails "my brain is computable"
> >> which entails I can say "yes to the doctor", which entails CTM.
>
> > No we don't for the reasons given.
>
> The reason above concerns immaterial machine. Not material one, like
> in comp alias CTM.
> (Then MGA proves that matter emerges from number relation, once we
> assume CTM, but this is not relevant).
>
> Are you really saying that if the laws of physics are computable, then
> we have to say "no" to the doctor?
No. The computability of physics does not entail either the truth or
the falsehood
of CTM
>This seems to contradict many
> statements you have made in preceding posts.
>
> Bruno
>
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Received on Fri Aug 28 2009 - 05:23:39 PDT