2009/8/27 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
>
>
>
> On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden>:
>
>> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
>> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
>> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
>> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov).
>>
>> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the
>> independance of implementation if computations are not real ?
>
> Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says
> real instances of computation are identical to physical processes.
If everything is reduced to physical interaction then computations
aren't real. Also that doesn't answer how it account for the
independance of implementation. As the computation is not primary, how
2 different physical process could generate the same computation
without abstract computations being the only thing that link the two
processes having existence. How can you make sense of church-turing
thesis if only "realized computations" make sense ?
Regards,
Quentin
> >
>
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Received on Fri Aug 28 2009 - 08:27:23 PDT