On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux <allco....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> 2009/8/26 David Nyman <david.ny....domain.name.hidden>:
> This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is
> independant of the (physical or ... virtual) implementation. If I
> perfom the computation on an abacus or within my head or with stones
> on the ground... it is the same (from the computation pov).
>
> And that's my problem with physicalism. How can it account for the
> independance of implementation if computations are not real ?
Physcialism doesn't say that computations aren't real. It says
real instances of computation are identical to physical processes.
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Received on Thu Aug 27 2009 - 10:42:32 PDT