2009/8/19 Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>:
> There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
> my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
>
>> >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your
>> >> "consciousness
>> >> of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.
>>
>> > No. I just have to deny immaterial existence.
>>
>> You have to deny the theorem of elementary arithmetic, which are used
>> by physicists (mostly through complex or trigonometric functions,
>> which reintroduce the natural numbers in the continuum).
>
> No. I don't have to deny their truth. I just have to deny that
> mathematical
> existence is ontological existence. As I have been
Then you're missusing 'existence'. Because using your language
existence = no existence at all ! for mathemetical existence... Why
bother using the word existence when you don't even mean it.
>
>> > You keep confusing the
>> > idea
>> > that theoretical entities could hypothetcially have certain beliefs
>> > with the
>> > actual existence of those entities and beliefs.
>>
>> You underestimate the dumbness of the DU, or sigma_1 arithmetic. It
>> contains the emulation of all the quantum states of the milky way,
>> with correct approximation of its neighborhood.
>
> Since it does not exist, it does not contain anything.
You say so, but you could repeat it ad infinitum, it won't render it truer.
>>It is hard to
>> recognize Peter Jones or Bruno Marchal from the huge relation and huge
>> numbers involved, in some emulations, but it is easy to prove there
>> exists, from the information the doctor got when scanning your brain.
>
> Same mistake
> All you can prove is that *if* the UD existed *then* it would
> contain such-and-such. But it doesn't actually exist.
>
>> In computations enough similar than our own most probable current one,
>> it is a "theorem" that those entities have such or such beliefs, and
>> behave in such and such ways, developing such and such discourses.
>>
>>
>>
>> >> Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that
>> >> "Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease
>> >> to
>> >> give referents to such "Peter Jones".
>>
>> > False. Standard comp says nothing about Platonism or AR.
>> > I can give a Johnsonian refutation of the UD. I can't see it,
>> > no-one can see it, so it ain't there.
>>
>> Standard comp says nothing about Plato's Platonism, but once you take
>> the digitalness seriously enough, and CT, it is just standard computer
>> science.
>
> That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
> You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
> ontological RITISAR existence.
So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're
running on a physical implementation... ok it's fair enough. My
question is *in that precise case*... What are you ? the program
written in whatever language it was written ? the functionnaly
equivalent program written in brainfuck ? the same written in the
machine language of the physical machine you're running on ? the
bytecode that would be JIT in a VM ? the transistor of the physical
machine ?
What IS RITSIAR when you'll be digitalized ?
If you're running, and I suspend the program ? Do *you* still exists ?
If I restart it ? Do you still exists ? If I never restart it do you
still exists ? If I destroy every copy of the program that is you do
you still exists ?
>> See "conscience & mécanisme" appendices for snapshot of a running
>> mathematical DU. It exists mathematically. But it can be implemented
>> "materially" , i.e. relatively to our most probable computations too.
>
> So? It hasn't been.
>
>> >> Fregean sense is enough to see
>> >> that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove
>> >> that
>> >> they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they
>> >> are not.
>>
>> > So? That doesn't man I am wrong, because it doesn't mean I am in
>> > the UD. The fact that we can see that a BIV has false beliefs
>> > doesn't make us wrong
>> > about anything.
>>
>> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
>> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us
>> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a correct
>> argumentation that *they* are material, and that what they see is
>> material.
>
> So? If you develop a correct argument that you are running on a
> computer
> when actually you are a BIV, then the BIV you will come up with that
> argument too. Any argument whatsoever can be undermined by a sceptical
> hypothesis, and there are many.
>
>> The problem is that if you are correct in "our physical
>> reality" their reasoning will be correct too, and false of course. But
>> then your reasoning has to be false too.
>> The only way to prevent this consists in saying that you are not
>> Turing-emulable, or that you just don't know if you are in the UD or
>> not.
>
> The way to prevent it is the same way that all sceptical hypotheses
> are prevented. You just note that there is not a scrap of evidence
> for them. The only upshot of scepticism is that there is no
> certainty, and we have to argue for the position of the greatest
> plausibility.
>
>
>>At this stage.
>> Then with step-8, you "know", relatively to the comp act of faith,
>> that you are already there. If you say yes to the doctor, you can bet,
>> from computer science that you are already in the (N,x,+) matrix.
>
> I can't be "in" something that has merely mathematical existence, any
> more than I can be "in" Nanrnia
So you can't be a program...
Regards,
Quentin
>
>> >> Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing
>> >> emulable.
>>
>> > No, it just has to be right. The fact that a simulated me
>> > *would8 be wrong doesn't mean the real me *is* wrong.
>>
>> But if you are correct in your reasoning, the simulated you has to be
>> correct to.
>
> False. You are treating all reasoning as being assumptionless and
> apriori. Both me's could have arguments of equal validity, but one of
> the argumetns could have true assumptions and the other false
> assumptionsm
> because the truth of the assumptions (and hence the soundness of the
> argument)
> depends on external factors which vary.
>
>>It is the same reasoning.
>> Or you have a special sense making you know that you are the "real"
>> one, but either that special sense is Turing emulable and your
>> doppelganger inherit them, or it is not Turing emulable, and you
>> better should say "no" to the doctor, because you would loose that
>> sense.
>
> I don't need to strenuously argue against that there is something
> special about me that makes me un-emulable , or un-BIV-able.
> I just have to note that there is no evidence for either hypothesis.
> The burden is on the sceptic.
>
>> >> If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.
>>
>> > Why can't I just get a guarantee that he will re-incarnate me
>> > materially?
>>
>> He will try.
>>
>> > Even if matter doesn't exist, I won't lose out.
>>
>> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
>> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
>> assuming comp. Matter is more or less the border of the ignorance of
>> universal machines (to be short). There is a fundamental physics which
>> capture the invariant for all possible universal machine observation,
>> and the rest is geography-history. Assuming comp the consistent-
>> contingent obeys laws.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> >
>
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Wed Aug 19 2009 - 11:28:44 PDT