Re: Emulation and Stuff

From: Flammarion <peterdjones.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 03:29:36 -0700 (PDT)

On 18 Aug, 09:12, Bruno Marchal <marc....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> On 17 Aug 2009, at 19:28, Flammarion wrote:

> >> So you reject arithmetical realism, and thus you reject comp.
>
> > The computaitonal Theory of Mind has no implications about Platonism.
>
> Comp is based on the notion of digitalness, which needs Church thesis.
> I will explain in detail why Church thesis needs arithmetical realism.
> I think that you are confusing everyone by switching "arithmetical
> realism" with "Platonism". If you call "Platonism" what I call
> "Arithmetical realism", I will put the result in the following way:
> comp => non physicalism. It leads to a reduction of the mind-body
> problem to the search of an explanation of stable beliefs in matter,
> without matter. AUDA provides the explanation, yet not the physical
> theory (but still the logic of physical propositions). It explains the
> appearance of "many worlds" below the substitution level.


The computaitonal Theory of Mind still has no implications about
Platonism.
As for "comp", that is another question...


> > You may of course mean something else by "comp".....
>
> >> Arithmetical realism is needed to give a sense to Church thesis,
> >> which
> >> is part of comp.
>
> > if AR is as claim abotu the immateial existence of numbers it does
> > not.
> > Not even remotely.
>
> AR is a claim that number exists independently of my body and soul.
> Number are immaterial, by definition.

So are ghosts and angels

> You don't need a theory of
> matter to explain what numbers are. On the contrary, all book which
> talk on matter assumes them more or less explicitly.


It doesn't take them as actually existent. Maths is used as
a language. English is used a langauge. English words
do not have immaterial existence in some heaven.

> >> Some posts ago, you seem to accept arithmetical realism, so I am no
> >> more sure of your position.
>
> > I may have assented to the *truth* of some propositions...
> > but truth is not existence. At least, the claim that
> > truth=existence is extraordinary and metaphysical...
>
> Mathematical existence = truth of existential mathematical statement.

existential mathematical statement="existence" used in fictive sense,
like "Hobbits exist
in Middle Earth"

> The number seven exists independently of me, is equivalent with the
> statement that the truth of the mathematical statement Ex(x =
> s(s(s(s(s(s(s(0)))))))) is true independently of me.

No. it is equivalent to the conjunction of that stament with
"and the mathematicians Ex is a claim of ontological existence".

> If you really believe that the number 07 has no existence at all, then
> the UDA reasoning does not go through,

at last!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

>but then you are abandoning
> comp because you can no more give sense to digitalness.

I am not abandoning the Computational Theory of Mind
because I can give a Quinean physical paraphrase of
computation. As for "comp", that is another question....

>You can still
> say "yes" to a doctor, but you have to refer to some analog material
> object, and not accept that you survive "qua computatio". This plays a
> role in step-8.

Exactly. The materialist computationalist says yes to being
reincarnated
on a physical computer, and no to magic beans.
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Received on Tue Aug 18 2009 - 03:29:36 PDT

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