Re: Emulation and Stuff

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Tue, 18 Aug 2009 12:25:16 +0200

On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:

> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingent existence of only
> some
> possible mathematical structures. That is a general statement that
> is not affected by juggling one theory for another. I have further
> defined PM in *terms* of such contingency.

That is actually very nice, because it follows the Plato-Aristotle-
Plotinus definition of matter which I follow in AUDA.
And this is enough for showing we don't have to reify matter (nor

  I don't see, indeed, how you can both define matter from contingent
structures and still pretend that matter is primitive.
Somehow you talk like you would be able to be *conscious* of the
existence of primitive matter.

All the Peter Jones which are generated by the UD, in the Tarski or
Fregean sense, (I don't care), will pretend that primitive matter does
not exist, and if your argument goes through, for rational reason and
logic (and not by mystical apprehension), those immaterial Peter Jones
will prove *correctly* that they are material, and this is a

So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your "consciousness
of primitive matter" relying on some non computational feature.

Note that if you accept "standard comp", you have to accept that
"Peter Jones is generated by the UD" makes sense, even if you cease to
give referents to such "Peter Jones". Fregean sense is enough to see
that those Peter Jones would correctly (if you are correct) prove that
they are material, when we know (reasoning outside the UD) than they
are not.

Your argument should be non UD accessible, and thus non Turing emulable.

If you feel being primitively material, just say "no" to the doctor.


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Received on Tue Aug 18 2009 - 12:25:16 PDT

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