Re: Everything is Just a Memory

From: Alastair Malcolm <>
Date: Sat, 29 Jan 2000 11:52:03 -0000

----- Original Message -----
From: Marchal <>

> Alastair Malcolm wrote:
> >I was always assuming that you were referring to a plenitude, I was just
> >trying to keep things simple by mentioning only one. A plenitude of
> >observer moments would have much the same problems as I mentioned for
> >with some compression available for the whole range of possible SAS (say
> >conscious) memories. More likely, I would guess, is that you are thinking
> >terms of a plenitude *including* all possible observer moments. If the
> >equation describing this plenitude is the same as an AUH theory, I can't
> >how your single observer moment theory differs from ordinary physics
> >(extended as necessary to encompass other universes).
> In what follows SE = Schrodinger Equation.
> Malcolm : plenitude = Everett worlds (SE granted)
> Griffith : plenitude = observer moments (1 or many ?) (SE granted ?)
> Higgo : plenitude = everything = every ideas (SE granted ?)
> Don't hesitate to correct me.

I will accept your kind invitation:

I (and others) have always tried to keep AUH's, and MWI's of QM (including
Everett), as two distinct concepts. For my own favourite AUH (which is quite
close to Tegmark's hypothesis), there are three possibilities, where in each
case one or more MWI's are encompassed within the AUH, provided they form
consistent theories in their own right.
(a) If all MWI's are inconsistent, they are not represented in the AUH -
this would appear unlikely.
(b) The simplest consistent MWI (cet. par.) does not provide the highest
measure for SAS's of our kind - again this would appear unlikely, because we
would count ourselves unlucky if the theory that gives the highest measure
for our kind (and therefore the theory almost certainly describing our
universe) happens to look indistinguishable from QM-based many worlds
(c) The simplest MWI *does* give the highest measure for our type of SAS -
this seems the most likely scenario out of (a), (b) and (c), but is not
*necessarily* the case.

So the plenitude I favour is likely to *include* Everett many worlds, but is
not equal to it, and may not even be dominated by it.

> Me : 3-plenitude is Arithmetical Truth (SE not granted, but AT
> includes
> computer sciences)
> 1-plenitude is Undefinable (too big!), but with comp SE is
> derivable,
> and
> Everett worlds are 1-observable by the machines who
> look below their level of substitution. (The Galouye
> effect).

I have been, and still am, interested in the conceptual foundations of your
thesis, Bruno, but have been waiting for an english translation. Should I
continue to wait, or have you the patience to answer some *very* basic
questions (like how you cope with the WR problem, and how is the appearance
of physics generated)?

Received on Sat Jan 29 2000 - 04:05:33 PST

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