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From: Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Thu Jan 27 09:06:28 2000

Fritz Griffith wrote:

*>How can you accept anything in science if you don't accept most of these
*

*>words? Some of these words are used in many currently accepted scientific
*

*>theories. Others are words that I am definitely not taking for granted, but
*

*>rather logically and rationally explaining.
*

Once you are searching the origin of physical laws, or the origin of

consciousness and belief in physical laws, you shouldn't accept 'things'

in

science at all. What people accept in science is exactly what I try

to justify in a way independent of empirical inferences. Most theories

just

compress information and are good tools for prediction, but seldomly

attempt

explanations at all.

*>So in other words you only accept the underlying mathematical equations that
*

*>describe a certain theory, and don't care about the possible interpretations
*

*>of those equations? > I know this approach to quantum mechanics as the "shut
*

*>up and calculate" method.
*

You don't understand. I don't accept the equations at all. Neither F=Ma,

nor

Schroedinger Equation (SE).

The equations are what I try to justify.

Remember what I said in an old post:

Copenhague = -SE for matter

-vague theory of mind

-Collapse

Everett = -SE for matter and he 'derives' a phenomenology of collapse

-comp

Me = comp (and I show both SE and Collapse necessarily derivable).

*>Personally, I believe that you're missing
*

*>something when you concentrate on the mathematics, and ignore what they
*

*>could possibly mean.
*

I do the contrary. It happens that my ontology is mathematical, even

arithmetical (I don't need more with comp, and in fact too much more would

lead to inconsistencies).

But I start from the intuitive meaning of that realm. You should not

confuse

the mathematical realm and formalism. I'm really interpretation driven.

The miracle is that Church thesis made it possible to prove a lot of

things

rigorously in a formalism independant way.

*>I don't consider my observer moment idea a new theory
*

*>altogether, but rather an interpretation of quantum mechanics, like
*

*>Copenhagen or MW. The underlying mathematical concepts are the same.
*

OK. But here is the probable big difference between you (and a lot of

people

in the list I guess) and me. I love QM, but I don't accept it for granted

at all. QM is what I try to explain, it is the goal, not my starting

point.

I have shown Comp => an Everett-like interpretation of arithmetical truth.

But if both comp and QM is correct, this Everett-like interpretation of

Arithmetical truth should gives SE + 'pure Everett', independently of any

empirical consideration.

(look at my UD Argument http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1635.html)

*>How is my observer moment theory incompatible with comp?
*

My feeling is that it is quite compatible with comp. But it is

still to fuzzy for me to make precise conclusion.

When I say I don't believe p, it does not mean I believe -p.

It means I don't know yet what to think.

Bruno

Received on Thu Jan 27 2000 - 09:06:28 PST

Date: Thu Jan 27 09:06:28 2000

Fritz Griffith wrote:

Once you are searching the origin of physical laws, or the origin of

consciousness and belief in physical laws, you shouldn't accept 'things'

in

science at all. What people accept in science is exactly what I try

to justify in a way independent of empirical inferences. Most theories

just

compress information and are good tools for prediction, but seldomly

attempt

explanations at all.

You don't understand. I don't accept the equations at all. Neither F=Ma,

nor

Schroedinger Equation (SE).

The equations are what I try to justify.

Remember what I said in an old post:

Copenhague = -SE for matter

-vague theory of mind

-Collapse

Everett = -SE for matter and he 'derives' a phenomenology of collapse

-comp

Me = comp (and I show both SE and Collapse necessarily derivable).

I do the contrary. It happens that my ontology is mathematical, even

arithmetical (I don't need more with comp, and in fact too much more would

lead to inconsistencies).

But I start from the intuitive meaning of that realm. You should not

confuse

the mathematical realm and formalism. I'm really interpretation driven.

The miracle is that Church thesis made it possible to prove a lot of

things

rigorously in a formalism independant way.

OK. But here is the probable big difference between you (and a lot of

people

in the list I guess) and me. I love QM, but I don't accept it for granted

at all. QM is what I try to explain, it is the goal, not my starting

point.

I have shown Comp => an Everett-like interpretation of arithmetical truth.

But if both comp and QM is correct, this Everett-like interpretation of

Arithmetical truth should gives SE + 'pure Everett', independently of any

empirical consideration.

(look at my UD Argument http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m1635.html)

My feeling is that it is quite compatible with comp. But it is

still to fuzzy for me to make precise conclusion.

When I say I don't believe p, it does not mean I believe -p.

It means I don't know yet what to think.

Bruno

Received on Thu Jan 27 2000 - 09:06:28 PST

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