On 21 Jul 2009, at 00:22, Brian Tenneson wrote:
> Comments below.
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Exercise: criticize the following papers mentioned below in the
>> light of the discovery of the universal machine and its main
>> consequences from incompleteness to first person indeterminacy.
>> Think of the identity thesis. To be sure Tegmark is less "wrong"
>> than Jannes.
>>
>> Solution: search in the archive of this list where I have already
>> explained this, or use directly UDA, or wait for what will
>> (perhaps) follow.
>>
>> I should send some of my papers on arXiv, but up to now, only
>> logicians understand the whole "trick", so I have to better
>> appreciated what physicians don't understand in logic, before
>> making a version free of references to mathematical logical
>> baggage. Logicians are not interested in mind, nor really matter,
>> and physicians are still naïve on the link consciousness/reality, I
>> would say.
>>
>> To be sure Tegmark is closer than most physicists except perhaps
>> Wheeler.
>>
>> Also, Tegmarks' argument for mathematicalism is invalid (even with
>> strong non-comp axioms). But I prefer to help you to understand
>> this by yourself through the understanding of what a universal
>> machine is, than trying a direct argument.
> I need to get a better grasp on what a universal machine is, yes. I
> am interested in finding out how Tegmark's argument for
> mathematicalism is invalid, especially since I'm using it to
> motivate my research.
At least you are aware that a mathematicalism à-la Tegmark needs a
rather sophisticated universal structure, but if we assume even very
weak version of comp, the universal machine provides that structure,
or that structure has to be reducible as an invariant for a set of
effective transformation of that machine. We can come back on this. I
may be wrong also.
>
>
>>
>> According of the part of UDA (or perhaps AUDA) you understand, you
>> can already see the weakness of such direct mathematical approach.
>> Note that comp makes physics much more fundamental, and separate it
>> much clearly from possible geograpies. Above all comp does not
>> eliminate the person, which Tegmark is still doing: the frog view
>> is not yet a first person view, in the comp sense.
>>
>> Interesting stuff, still. Thanks for the references.
> I'll have to think more on Jannes' paper. As I basically resting
> the motivation of my research on the correctness of "ERH implies
> MUH," I'm trying to formulate a good refutation to his paper.
OK, nice.
My main critics is that they seem not be aware of the consciousness/
reality problem. They are using an identify thesis which is not
allowed by comp. The UD argument shows exactly that. It is build to
show that if we keep consciousness, eventually, physics is even more
fundamental than physicist imagine. The physical world(s) is(are) not
just a 'sufficiently rich' part of math, it is somehow the border of
the ignorance of any (Löbian) universal machine which introspects
itself. This connects in some way all part 'sufficiently rich' part
of math". It explains also the non communicable part of what we can be
conscious of, including physical sensations (as modalities related to
self-references).
Bruno
>
>
>
> >
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Received on Tue Jul 21 2009 - 01:28:49 PDT