RE: Everything is Just a Memory

From: Higgo James <>
Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2000 10:43:56 -0000

Russell, you say: "come up with a convincing counterexample of how
consciousness could work in another way".

Firstly, you have not defined consciousness. Secondly, you have not defined
how it works your way (and nether have such dignitaries as Dennett).
Thirdly, I offer you a perfectly logical explanation for 'consciousness'
(the existence of this thought, which is all we need to explain) - that this
observer-moment exists. You refute this answer for no reason other than you
_need_ more than that. Occam would be disgusted.

Chin chin

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Russell Standish []
> Sent: Monday, January 17, 2000 4:36 AM
> To:
> Cc:
> Subject: Re: Everything is Just a Memory
> Fritz Griffith wrote:
> >
> > I'd like to hear just one good reason why you are dismissing these
> ideas.
> > You seem to have a lot of ignorance towards solipsism (whatever exactly
> that
> > is), yet you don't give any reasons why. As best as I can understand,
> you
> > think my ideas are crossing too far into philosophical territory, where
> > nothing gets accomplished. This often happens when too many assumptions
> are
> > made. I took the opposite approach, however; I made no assumptions, and
> > used logic and reasoning to draw my conclusions. Please point out just
> > where this theory goes wrong.
> >
> >
> Bruno pointed out why solipsism is a sterile philosophy, so I won't
> need to go into that. The reason I was comparing your ideas to that,
> was based on an interpretation of your discussion. I can see your
> ideas have been refined away from the initial extreme position in
> discussion with James Higgo.
> In its extreme position, you are saying that only one observer moment
> exists, all else are but memories connected to this. This is
> solipsism, as no other point of view can exist, nor is there even any
> process, except in memory.
> In your slightly less extreme versions, you affirm that all observer
> moments exist, but are not connected in any way to each
> other. Therefore, you should just expect to find yourself at one
> observer moment, one of the most likely according to the ASSA. The
> problem with this is what is the practical difference between this
> point of view and the extreme position above, except that you've
> answered the question of why this observer-moment, and not some
> other. In particular, there is no time for you to interact with the
> universe and find out about other observer-moments - you only have
> memories. I would label this as "neo-solipsism".
> Finally, you could assume that one is sampling the observer moment
> distribution, as a sequence embedded in some external time
> dimension. This view was deemed repugnant by Jacques when I suggested
> it. It presumably is rejected because it introduces the very concept
> (that of time) that you want to get rid of. In any case it presents a
> problem of how a conscious entity can make a coherent sense of the
> universe.
> As I have stated elsewhere in this discussion list (and in my Occam
> paper) I believe instead that time should be elevated to a fundamental
> postulate of conscious - without time consciousness can't exist, and
> time provides a means for linking observer moments. Conscious entities
> project out sequences of observer moments from the plenitude, these
> sequences defining connections between them.
> I take these postulates of consciousness (that of projection and of
> time) to be true, just as I accept the Church thesis to be true. If
> someone could come up with a convincing counterexample of how
> consciousness could work in another way, then I will need to revisit
> these assumptions.
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
> Dr. Russell Standish Director
> High Performance Computing Support Unit,
> University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
> Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
> Australia
> Room 2075, Red Centre
> --------------------------------------------------------------------------
> --
Received on Mon Jan 17 2000 - 02:43:24 PST

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