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From: Stephen Paul King <stephenk1.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 13:53:14 -0400

Hi Bruno,

Interleaving some comments.

----- Original Message -----

From: Bruno Marchal

To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden ; Stephen Paul King

Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2009 1:51 PM

Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?

On 08 May 2009, at 17:49, Stephen Paul King wrote:

I came upon the idea after considering how is it that the notion of an "objective reality" when we know for a fact that all of our knowledge does not come from any kind of direct contact with an "objective reality", at best it is infered.

Yes. Even at the deepest level. Science transforms knowledge into belief by making us aware of the hypothetical nature of our mental construction.

I would say that science is the condition of genuine faith or bets.

[spk]

Falsifiable bets. ;)

Leibniz' Monadology can be considered as a way to think of this idea where each monad represents a 1-PoV.

Difficult to make sense. Leibniz is a complex and variable author. I have read the Monadology and consult some expert of Leibniz, but it remains hard to figure out how it works.

[spk]

Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, "orderings", and not some independent substance or container.

A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a "common world of experience".

Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of synchronization?

[spk]

No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a "commn world of experience" is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system. It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities.

What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a "pre-ordained harmony", his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality": "...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, ...., and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence." pg. 317-318

When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different. All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a "collective unconsciousness" that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc.

The notion of "synchronization" is a figure of speach, a stand in, for that is called "decoherence" in QM theory. By seeing that the phase relations of many small QM systems tend to become entangled and no longed localizable, we get the notion of a classical finite world. This is a "bottom up" explanation.

BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by intensionally neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one to the conclusion that infinities might actually exist!

The 3PoV would follow from a form of inversion or reflection of a 1PoV. For example, we form thoughts of or fellow humans from our own experiences of ourselves. BTW: it seems to me that consciousness, at least, requires some form of dynamic self- modeling process. This implies that there is no such a thing as a static consciousness.

I can agree. And you know the way I proceed. I start from elementary arithmetic, the 3-elementary ontology. If only because 99,9% of the humans agree on it, and it is already Turing universal and contains the whole universal deployment. The epistemology is given by adding some induction schema to the machine in there. It is illustrated by the going from Robinson arithmetic to Peano Arithmetic (emulated by Robinson arithmetic). It is enough to generate all "finite piece of histories", and we can get the many 1-pov by the "Theaetetical variant of the logic of provability/consistency ...

So, if you agree that all dynamics are contained in the block-arithmetical truth, consciousness is indeed related to "internal information flux", and so we can say there is no static consciousness, in that sense. But here we mix the 3-description with the 1-description, and from this we cannot conclude that we cannot have a conscious experience of static-ity or static-ness. With comp, just because it remains a lot of work, the question of traveling in many different physical directions is just open (obviously).

[spk]

But here is the problem I have, merely "agreeing" that "all dynamics are contained in the "block-arithmatic truth" will require me to neglect the computational complexity of that "Block Truth".

I had a conversation with Julian Barbour about this, trying to get him to aknowledge his own discussion of how computational intensive his own theory was/is, and he simply refused to see. It is the same problem that Leibniz has with his notion of a "pre-ordained harmony". The computation of all possible combinations of events needed to find the one that is "most optimal" has already be proven to be intractible. Stephen Wolfram wrote of this: "...many physical systems are computationally irreducible, so that their own evolution is effectively the most efficient procedure for determining their future."

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html

The idea of a Platonic Universe of Arithmetical truth is a notion that is only coherent given the tacit assumption to some non-static process, such as that implicit in thought, also co-exists. A What requires a To Whom. Being is the Fixed-Point of Becoming.

Re the UD Measure problem: The idea i have is that we either have our infinity within each Monad or try to find a way to derive a measure of the infinity without reference to the only source of definiteness that we have available: our conscious experience.

If I interpret favorably what you say, this is the passage from UDA to AUDA, where I substitute "you working on UDA", by "the lobian universal machine working on UDA".

I don't insist on this because it can be misunderstood. AUDA looks like an elimination of the need to refer to "consciousness", but AUDA without a prior understanding of UDA, would be like a confusion between theology and computer science, comp can only relate them, not identify them it would be an error, explainable in AUDA (!!!!!), to confuse them. Only God confuses them; in sense, but a creature which confuses them is either a zombie, or a fake zombie, or a person eliminativist.

You can regain consciousness in AUDA, by "defining" consciousness by the "belief (hope, bet, faith) in a reality". But the bet is unconscious itself, and this is partially why we are bounded, at some level, to confuse this very basic belief with a knowledge.

Of course it is a knowledge, but only at the G* level, *we* cannot know that, once we bet there is a reality (whatever it is).

All this does not mean that you could not try an alternate theory were the 3-pov emerge from the 1-pov, but with comp, the basic ontology is very simple (numbers, addition and multiplication). And then 1-pov, or OMs, appears very sophisticated. They are given "intuitively" by all possible computations passing to a "current state", together with a topology derivable from the self-reference logic (I think you know that).

Bruno

[spk]

The problem is that all notions such as "substitute", "misunderstood", "understanding", "emerge", etc. all require some form of non-staticness. Simple existence, "necessary possibility", is not enough. The comp model is wonderfull, but it requires an engine of implementation.

Onward!

Stephen

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Received on Tue May 12 2009 - 13:53:14 PDT

Date: Tue, 12 May 2009 13:53:14 -0400

Hi Bruno,

Interleaving some comments.

----- Original Message -----

From: Bruno Marchal

To: everything-list.domain.name.hidden ; Stephen Paul King

Sent: Sunday, May 10, 2009 1:51 PM

Subject: Re: 3-PoV from 1 PoV?

On 08 May 2009, at 17:49, Stephen Paul King wrote:

I came upon the idea after considering how is it that the notion of an "objective reality" when we know for a fact that all of our knowledge does not come from any kind of direct contact with an "objective reality", at best it is infered.

Yes. Even at the deepest level. Science transforms knowledge into belief by making us aware of the hypothetical nature of our mental construction.

I would say that science is the condition of genuine faith or bets.

[spk]

Falsifiable bets. ;)

Leibniz' Monadology can be considered as a way to think of this idea where each monad represents a 1-PoV.

Difficult to make sense. Leibniz is a complex and variable author. I have read the Monadology and consult some expert of Leibniz, but it remains hard to figure out how it works.

[spk]

Leibniz' Monadology is difficult to comprehend because he starts off with an inversion of the usual way of thinking about the world. By assuming that the observer's point of view is the primitive, it follows that the notions of space and time are secondary, "orderings", and not some independent substance or container.

A synchronization of many such 1PoV, given some simple consistensy requirements, would in the large number limit lead to a notion of a "common world of experience".

Don't you need some "common world of experience" to have a notion of synchronization?

[spk]

No, not if all of the structure that one might attribute to a "commn world of experience" is already within the notion of a monad. A Monad, considered in isolation, is exactly like an infinite quantum mechanical system. It has no definite set of particular properties, it has *all properties* as possibilities.

What I am considering is to replace Leibniz' notion of a "pre-ordained harmony", his version of a a priori existing measure, I propose a notion of local ongoing process. A generalized notion of information processing or computation, for example. We see this idea expressed by David Deutsch in his book, The Fabric of Reality": "...think of all of our knowledge-generating processes, ...., and indeed the entire evolving biosphere as well, as being a gigantic computation. The whole thing is executiong a self-motivated, self-generating computer program. ... it is a virtual-reality program in the process of rendering, with ever increasing accuracy, the whole of existence." pg. 317-318

When we consider an infinity of Monads, each, unless it is identical to some other, is at least infinitesimably different. All of the aspects of a collections of Monads that are identical collapse into a single state, a notion of a background emerges from this. This idea is not different from the notion of a "collective unconsciousness" that some thinkers like Karl Jung have proposed. This leave us with finite distinctions between monads. Finite distictions leads us to notions of distinguishing finite processes, etc.

The notion of "synchronization" is a figure of speach, a stand in, for that is called "decoherence" in QM theory. By seeing that the phase relations of many small QM systems tend to become entangled and no longed localizable, we get the notion of a classical finite world. This is a "bottom up" explanation.

BTW: Notions, such as finitism, might be explained by intensionally neglecting any continuance of thought that takes one to the conclusion that infinities might actually exist!

The 3PoV would follow from a form of inversion or reflection of a 1PoV. For example, we form thoughts of or fellow humans from our own experiences of ourselves. BTW: it seems to me that consciousness, at least, requires some form of dynamic self- modeling process. This implies that there is no such a thing as a static consciousness.

I can agree. And you know the way I proceed. I start from elementary arithmetic, the 3-elementary ontology. If only because 99,9% of the humans agree on it, and it is already Turing universal and contains the whole universal deployment. The epistemology is given by adding some induction schema to the machine in there. It is illustrated by the going from Robinson arithmetic to Peano Arithmetic (emulated by Robinson arithmetic). It is enough to generate all "finite piece of histories", and we can get the many 1-pov by the "Theaetetical variant of the logic of provability/consistency ...

So, if you agree that all dynamics are contained in the block-arithmetical truth, consciousness is indeed related to "internal information flux", and so we can say there is no static consciousness, in that sense. But here we mix the 3-description with the 1-description, and from this we cannot conclude that we cannot have a conscious experience of static-ity or static-ness. With comp, just because it remains a lot of work, the question of traveling in many different physical directions is just open (obviously).

[spk]

But here is the problem I have, merely "agreeing" that "all dynamics are contained in the "block-arithmatic truth" will require me to neglect the computational complexity of that "Block Truth".

I had a conversation with Julian Barbour about this, trying to get him to aknowledge his own discussion of how computational intensive his own theory was/is, and he simply refused to see. It is the same problem that Leibniz has with his notion of a "pre-ordained harmony". The computation of all possible combinations of events needed to find the one that is "most optimal" has already be proven to be intractible. Stephen Wolfram wrote of this: "...many physical systems are computationally irreducible, so that their own evolution is effectively the most efficient procedure for determining their future."

http://www.stephenwolfram.com/publications/articles/physics/85-undecidability/2/text.html

The idea of a Platonic Universe of Arithmetical truth is a notion that is only coherent given the tacit assumption to some non-static process, such as that implicit in thought, also co-exists. A What requires a To Whom. Being is the Fixed-Point of Becoming.

Re the UD Measure problem: The idea i have is that we either have our infinity within each Monad or try to find a way to derive a measure of the infinity without reference to the only source of definiteness that we have available: our conscious experience.

If I interpret favorably what you say, this is the passage from UDA to AUDA, where I substitute "you working on UDA", by "the lobian universal machine working on UDA".

I don't insist on this because it can be misunderstood. AUDA looks like an elimination of the need to refer to "consciousness", but AUDA without a prior understanding of UDA, would be like a confusion between theology and computer science, comp can only relate them, not identify them it would be an error, explainable in AUDA (!!!!!), to confuse them. Only God confuses them; in sense, but a creature which confuses them is either a zombie, or a fake zombie, or a person eliminativist.

You can regain consciousness in AUDA, by "defining" consciousness by the "belief (hope, bet, faith) in a reality". But the bet is unconscious itself, and this is partially why we are bounded, at some level, to confuse this very basic belief with a knowledge.

Of course it is a knowledge, but only at the G* level, *we* cannot know that, once we bet there is a reality (whatever it is).

All this does not mean that you could not try an alternate theory were the 3-pov emerge from the 1-pov, but with comp, the basic ontology is very simple (numbers, addition and multiplication). And then 1-pov, or OMs, appears very sophisticated. They are given "intuitively" by all possible computations passing to a "current state", together with a topology derivable from the self-reference logic (I think you know that).

Bruno

[spk]

The problem is that all notions such as "substitute", "misunderstood", "understanding", "emerge", etc. all require some form of non-staticness. Simple existence, "necessary possibility", is not enough. The comp model is wonderfull, but it requires an engine of implementation.

Onward!

Stephen

--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~

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To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden

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Received on Tue May 12 2009 - 13:53:14 PDT

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