Re: on simply being an SAS

From: Russell Standish <>
Date: Wed, 12 Jan 100 09:58:51 +1100 (EST)

> Russell Standish wrote:
> >I'm not entirely sure how to interpret this. If what you're saying is
> >that QM is computable (of course we can solve the Schroedinger
> >equation and evolve it deterministically), therefore the individual
> >observers in the multiverse are computed by this simulation, then you
> >are wrong.
> I quite disagree. They are computed and relatively multiplied.
> It is Everett insight to show that [the observer + object evolved
> deterministicaly] entails the quantum *statistic* from the point
> of view of the observer. It is really 1-statistics.
> Is it not the basic motivation for everything-type of explanation?

I think we're in closer agreement here than you realise. It is
somewhat a matter of semantics. For me, for a computation to be
"realised", it must be separated from the output of the UD. We're
using slightly different interpretations of "computed" here. I'm not
so concerned, no that I know what you mean. However, the biggie is
related to Schmidhuber and COMP - more on this below.

> >The computation does not contain within it the actual
> >observations by the observers - all it contains is probability
> >distributions for the attributes the observers see. The actual
> >observations are simply resolved by chance.
> There is no need for 3-chance. There is only 1-chance.
> That is chance from the point of view of the computed (emulated)
> observers. It looks locally as 3-chance because our computations
> are (classicaly) entangled.
> It is the same chance that the one occuring in the self-duplication
> experiment.

I quite agree. The word "chance" I used above is 1-chance - I don't
actually believe there is a 3-chance (maybe to Jacque's relief - I'm
not sure :)

> >This is easier to discuss using the Schmidhuber Plenitude, which i
> >ascribe to as a great idea. Unfortunately, the Schmidhuber Plentiude
> >does not imply COMP (If it does, I'd be interested to see the proof!)
> You force me to reread Schmidhuber! OK, I can assure you:
> COMP = Schmidhuber Plenitude.
> Schimudhuber Plenitude *per se* is what I called once UD*. That is
> the complete running of the UD.
> COMP say that my actual state belongs to UD*. If that whas not the
> case in Schimudhuber Plenitude, it would hardly be a candidate for a
> theory of everything.
> So Schmidhuber and me have exactly the same postulates.

This is _not_ how I read it. Paraphrasing your thesis, COMP is the
assertion that "you can survive the replacement of your brain by a
digital machine" at some level of replacement. I am reasonably
comfortable with what you mean by survive in this instance. I outlined
a possible subsitution mechanism whereby the brain is replaced by
analogue machines, which I don't doubt will allow survival. One can
then replace these analogue devices by digital ones, simply by
discretising the analogue quantities in a suitably fine way. Note,
that there is still instrinsic randomness in the behaviour of the
neurons, which can be discretised also with digital devices.

I then asked you whether by digital device, you meant a "Universal
Turing Machine". This is where I part company with you, as I suspect
that (1-)randomness has something to do with free will. Therefore, I
predict that Robot beings based on classical turing machines will
never have free will (although how one can establish this from the
outside via a Turing-like test I don't know). However, if we relax the
requirement that Robots be strict Turing machines, then I fully
suspect a machine could be built that had free will, as I believe that
human beings are no more than machines built from proteins.

Now, you are saying that the level of substitution implied in COMP is
running the whole plenitude on a computer - Schmidhuber style. How
does this relate to substitution of analogue brains by Turing machines
within the individual observer world? It seems to me a case of chalk
and cheese - two things that have nothing to do with each other.

It seems to me (although I haven't followed you argument to the nth
degree), that you are claiming in your thesis that
COMP=>Schmidhuber. That may be true, however, I would very much doubt
that Schmidhuber=>COMP. You haven't advanced a poof of this.

> >If your "digital" copy passes the Turing test, I will not know whether
> >it is a zombie or not.
> Honestly I am not sure I care about what you *know* or pretend
> to know, I'm afraid.
> The real question is the following. Suppose for the sake of the
> argument than your daughter falls in love with my "digital" copy.
> And suppose that *in all apparences" my "digital" copy *seems* in
> love with your daughter.
> Would you agree with my "digital" copy getting married with
> your daughter?

Of course. All that matters for my daughter's happiness is that her
spouse behaves to _all_ intents and purposes like the real thing.

> BTW how do you know *I* am not a zombie?
> In these matter we can only bet, isn't it? (with comp this is
> a theorem).
> Best Regards
> Bruno

Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Room 2075, Red Centre
Received on Tue Jan 11 2000 - 14:57:28 PST

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