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From: Russell Standish <R.Standish.domain.name.hidden>

Date: Wed, 12 Jan 100 09:58:51 +1100 (EST)

*>
*

*> Russell Standish wrote:
*

*>
*

*> >I'm not entirely sure how to interpret this. If what you're saying is
*

*> >that QM is computable (of course we can solve the Schroedinger
*

*> >equation and evolve it deterministically), therefore the individual
*

*> >observers in the multiverse are computed by this simulation, then you
*

*> >are wrong.
*

*>
*

*> I quite disagree. They are computed and relatively multiplied.
*

*> It is Everett insight to show that [the observer + object evolved
*

*> deterministicaly] entails the quantum *statistic* from the point
*

*> of view of the observer. It is really 1-statistics.
*

*>
*

*> Is it not the basic motivation for everything-type of explanation?
*

I think we're in closer agreement here than you realise. It is

somewhat a matter of semantics. For me, for a computation to be

"realised", it must be separated from the output of the UD. We're

using slightly different interpretations of "computed" here. I'm not

so concerned, no that I know what you mean. However, the biggie is

related to Schmidhuber and COMP - more on this below.

*>
*

*> >The computation does not contain within it the actual
*

*> >observations by the observers - all it contains is probability
*

*> >distributions for the attributes the observers see. The actual
*

*> >observations are simply resolved by chance.
*

*>
*

*> There is no need for 3-chance. There is only 1-chance.
*

*> That is chance from the point of view of the computed (emulated)
*

*> observers. It looks locally as 3-chance because our computations
*

*> are (classicaly) entangled.
*

*> It is the same chance that the one occuring in the self-duplication
*

*> experiment.
*

*>
*

I quite agree. The word "chance" I used above is 1-chance - I don't

actually believe there is a 3-chance (maybe to Jacque's relief - I'm

not sure :)

*>
*

*> >This is easier to discuss using the Schmidhuber Plenitude, which i
*

*> >ascribe to as a great idea. Unfortunately, the Schmidhuber Plentiude
*

*> >does not imply COMP (If it does, I'd be interested to see the proof!)
*

*>
*

*> You force me to reread Schmidhuber! OK, I can assure you:
*

*>
*

*> COMP = Schmidhuber Plenitude.
*

*>
*

*> Schimudhuber Plenitude *per se* is what I called once UD*. That is
*

*> the complete running of the UD.
*

*> COMP say that my actual state belongs to UD*. If that whas not the
*

*> case in Schimudhuber Plenitude, it would hardly be a candidate for a
*

*> theory of everything.
*

*>
*

*> So Schmidhuber and me have exactly the same postulates.
*

This is _not_ how I read it. Paraphrasing your thesis, COMP is the

assertion that "you can survive the replacement of your brain by a

digital machine" at some level of replacement. I am reasonably

comfortable with what you mean by survive in this instance. I outlined

a possible subsitution mechanism whereby the brain is replaced by

analogue machines, which I don't doubt will allow survival. One can

then replace these analogue devices by digital ones, simply by

discretising the analogue quantities in a suitably fine way. Note,

that there is still instrinsic randomness in the behaviour of the

neurons, which can be discretised also with digital devices.

I then asked you whether by digital device, you meant a "Universal

Turing Machine". This is where I part company with you, as I suspect

that (1-)randomness has something to do with free will. Therefore, I

predict that Robot beings based on classical turing machines will

never have free will (although how one can establish this from the

outside via a Turing-like test I don't know). However, if we relax the

requirement that Robots be strict Turing machines, then I fully

suspect a machine could be built that had free will, as I believe that

human beings are no more than machines built from proteins.

Now, you are saying that the level of substitution implied in COMP is

running the whole plenitude on a computer - Schmidhuber style. How

does this relate to substitution of analogue brains by Turing machines

within the individual observer world? It seems to me a case of chalk

and cheese - two things that have nothing to do with each other.

It seems to me (although I haven't followed you argument to the nth

degree), that you are claiming in your thesis that

COMP=>Schmidhuber. That may be true, however, I would very much doubt

that Schmidhuber=>COMP. You haven't advanced a poof of this.

*>
*

*> >If your "digital" copy passes the Turing test, I will not know whether
*

*> >it is a zombie or not.
*

*>
*

*> Honestly I am not sure I care about what you *know* or pretend
*

*> to know, I'm afraid.
*

*> The real question is the following. Suppose for the sake of the
*

*> argument than your daughter falls in love with my "digital" copy.
*

*> And suppose that *in all apparences" my "digital" copy *seems* in
*

*> love with your daughter.
*

*> Would you agree with my "digital" copy getting married with
*

*> your daughter?
*

Of course. All that matters for my daughter's happiness is that her

spouse behaves to _all_ intents and purposes like the real thing.

*>
*

*> BTW how do you know *I* am not a zombie?
*

*> In these matter we can only bet, isn't it? (with comp this is
*

*> a theorem).
*

*>
*

*> Best Regards
*

*> Bruno
*

*>
*

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Russell Standish Director

High Performance Computing Support Unit,

University of NSW Phone 9385 6967

Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965

Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden

Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received on Tue Jan 11 2000 - 14:57:28 PST

Date: Wed, 12 Jan 100 09:58:51 +1100 (EST)

I think we're in closer agreement here than you realise. It is

somewhat a matter of semantics. For me, for a computation to be

"realised", it must be separated from the output of the UD. We're

using slightly different interpretations of "computed" here. I'm not

so concerned, no that I know what you mean. However, the biggie is

related to Schmidhuber and COMP - more on this below.

I quite agree. The word "chance" I used above is 1-chance - I don't

actually believe there is a 3-chance (maybe to Jacque's relief - I'm

not sure :)

This is _not_ how I read it. Paraphrasing your thesis, COMP is the

assertion that "you can survive the replacement of your brain by a

digital machine" at some level of replacement. I am reasonably

comfortable with what you mean by survive in this instance. I outlined

a possible subsitution mechanism whereby the brain is replaced by

analogue machines, which I don't doubt will allow survival. One can

then replace these analogue devices by digital ones, simply by

discretising the analogue quantities in a suitably fine way. Note,

that there is still instrinsic randomness in the behaviour of the

neurons, which can be discretised also with digital devices.

I then asked you whether by digital device, you meant a "Universal

Turing Machine". This is where I part company with you, as I suspect

that (1-)randomness has something to do with free will. Therefore, I

predict that Robot beings based on classical turing machines will

never have free will (although how one can establish this from the

outside via a Turing-like test I don't know). However, if we relax the

requirement that Robots be strict Turing machines, then I fully

suspect a machine could be built that had free will, as I believe that

human beings are no more than machines built from proteins.

Now, you are saying that the level of substitution implied in COMP is

running the whole plenitude on a computer - Schmidhuber style. How

does this relate to substitution of analogue brains by Turing machines

within the individual observer world? It seems to me a case of chalk

and cheese - two things that have nothing to do with each other.

It seems to me (although I haven't followed you argument to the nth

degree), that you are claiming in your thesis that

COMP=>Schmidhuber. That may be true, however, I would very much doubt

that Schmidhuber=>COMP. You haven't advanced a poof of this.

Of course. All that matters for my daughter's happiness is that her

spouse behaves to _all_ intents and purposes like the real thing.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Russell Standish Director

High Performance Computing Support Unit,

University of NSW Phone 9385 6967

Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965

Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden

Room 2075, Red Centre http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks

----------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received on Tue Jan 11 2000 - 14:57:28 PST

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