>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> >I'm not entirely sure how to interpret this. If what you're saying is
> >that QM is computable (of course we can solve the Schroedinger
> >equation and evolve it deterministically), therefore the individual
> >observers in the multiverse are computed by this simulation, then you
> >are wrong.
>
> I quite disagree. They are computed and relatively multiplied.
> It is Everett insight to show that [the observer + object evolved
> deterministicaly] entails the quantum *statistic* from the point
> of view of the observer. It is really 1-statistics.
>
> Is it not the basic motivation for everything-type of explanation?
I think we're in closer agreement here than you realise. It is
somewhat a matter of semantics. For me, for a computation to be
"realised", it must be separated from the output of the UD. We're
using slightly different interpretations of "computed" here. I'm not
so concerned, no that I know what you mean. However, the biggie is
related to Schmidhuber and COMP - more on this below.
>
> >The computation does not contain within it the actual
> >observations by the observers - all it contains is probability
> >distributions for the attributes the observers see. The actual
> >observations are simply resolved by chance.
>
> There is no need for 3-chance. There is only 1-chance.
> That is chance from the point of view of the computed (emulated)
> observers. It looks locally as 3-chance because our computations
> are (classicaly) entangled.
> It is the same chance that the one occuring in the self-duplication
> experiment.
>
I quite agree. The word "chance" I used above is 1-chance - I don't
actually believe there is a 3-chance (maybe to Jacque's relief - I'm
not sure :)
>
> >This is easier to discuss using the Schmidhuber Plenitude, which i
> >ascribe to as a great idea. Unfortunately, the Schmidhuber Plentiude
> >does not imply COMP (If it does, I'd be interested to see the proof!)
>
> You force me to reread Schmidhuber! OK, I can assure you:
>
> COMP = Schmidhuber Plenitude.
>
> Schimudhuber Plenitude *per se* is what I called once UD*. That is
> the complete running of the UD.
> COMP say that my actual state belongs to UD*. If that whas not the
> case in Schimudhuber Plenitude, it would hardly be a candidate for a
> theory of everything.
>
> So Schmidhuber and me have exactly the same postulates.
This is _not_ how I read it. Paraphrasing your thesis, COMP is the
assertion that "you can survive the replacement of your brain by a
digital machine" at some level of replacement. I am reasonably
comfortable with what you mean by survive in this instance. I outlined
a possible subsitution mechanism whereby the brain is replaced by
analogue machines, which I don't doubt will allow survival. One can
then replace these analogue devices by digital ones, simply by
discretising the analogue quantities in a suitably fine way. Note,
that there is still instrinsic randomness in the behaviour of the
neurons, which can be discretised also with digital devices.
I then asked you whether by digital device, you meant a "Universal
Turing Machine". This is where I part company with you, as I suspect
that (1-)randomness has something to do with free will. Therefore, I
predict that Robot beings based on classical turing machines will
never have free will (although how one can establish this from the
outside via a Turing-like test I don't know). However, if we relax the
requirement that Robots be strict Turing machines, then I fully
suspect a machine could be built that had free will, as I believe that
human beings are no more than machines built from proteins.
Now, you are saying that the level of substitution implied in COMP is
running the whole plenitude on a computer - Schmidhuber style. How
does this relate to substitution of analogue brains by Turing machines
within the individual observer world? It seems to me a case of chalk
and cheese - two things that have nothing to do with each other.
It seems to me (although I haven't followed you argument to the nth
degree), that you are claiming in your thesis that
COMP=>Schmidhuber. That may be true, however, I would very much doubt
that Schmidhuber=>COMP. You haven't advanced a poof of this.
>
> >If your "digital" copy passes the Turing test, I will not know whether
> >it is a zombie or not.
>
> Honestly I am not sure I care about what you *know* or pretend
> to know, I'm afraid.
> The real question is the following. Suppose for the sake of the
> argument than your daughter falls in love with my "digital" copy.
> And suppose that *in all apparences" my "digital" copy *seems* in
> love with your daughter.
> Would you agree with my "digital" copy getting married with
> your daughter?
Of course. All that matters for my daughter's happiness is that her
spouse behaves to _all_ intents and purposes like the real thing.
>
> BTW how do you know *I* am not a zombie?
> In these matter we can only bet, isn't it? (with comp this is
> a theorem).
>
> Best Regards
> Bruno
>
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Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit,
University of NSW Phone 9385 6967
Sydney 2052 Fax 9385 6965
Australia R.Standish.domain.name.hidden
Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
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Received on Tue Jan 11 2000 - 14:57:28 PST