Russell Standish wrote:
>I'm not entirely sure how to interpret this. If what you're saying is
>that QM is computable (of course we can solve the Schroedinger
>equation and evolve it deterministically), therefore the individual
>observers in the multiverse are computed by this simulation, then you
>are wrong.
I quite disagree. They are computed and relatively multiplied.
It is Everett insight to show that [the observer + object evolved
deterministicaly] entails the quantum *statistic* from the point
of view of the observer. It is really 1-statistics.
Is it not the basic motivation for everything-type of explanation?
(remember Hal Finney first sentences in the first post of this
discussion list:
<<A weak notion of the idea that all universes exist is the many worlds
interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is basically regular QM minus
wave function collapse. Everett showed that, if you look at it right,
a universe which does not have wave function collapse could actually be
said to look to its inhabitants as though it did have collapse.
This has the advantage that the universe becomes deterministic, and
there is no new information or randomness which must appear as the
universe evolves.>>)
And Everett makes that clear in his "theory of the universal wave
function".
>The computation does not contain within it the actual
>observations by the observers - all it contains is probability
>distributions for the attributes the observers see. The actual
>observations are simply resolved by chance.
There is no need for 3-chance. There is only 1-chance.
That is chance from the point of view of the computed (emulated)
observers. It looks locally as 3-chance because our computations
are (classicaly) entangled.
It is the same chance that the one occuring in the self-duplication
experiment.
>This is easier to discuss using the Schmidhuber Plenitude, which i
>ascribe to as a great idea. Unfortunately, the Schmidhuber Plentiude
>does not imply COMP (If it does, I'd be interested to see the proof!)
You force me to reread Schmidhuber! OK, I can assure you:
COMP = Schmidhuber Plenitude.
Schimudhuber Plenitude *per se* is what I called once UD*. That is
the complete running of the UD.
COMP say that my actual state belongs to UD*. If that whas not the
case in Schimudhuber Plenitude, it would hardly be a candidate for a
theory of everything.
So Schmidhuber and me have exactly the same postulates.
Unfortunately Schmidhuber seems not to be aware of the distinction
between first and third person/machine's point of view.
So he missed the computationalist indeterminisme, the white rabbit,
the random oracle phenomenology, the continuum phenomenology,
the uncomputability feature of the apparent universe, the
non existence of any substancial universe, etc.
Schmidhuber believes in a naive mind/body relation which
makes him believe that observer can be attached to their
computable universe. If that was the case the universal prior
would probably be enough to "explain the white rabbit away".
But all my reasoning shows such attachement cannot
exist.
Schmidhuber believes classical problems of philosophy go away.
I believe comp gives just a way to *formulate* them.
But there is no doubt we believe in the same comp hyp. His
invocation of the compiler theorem witnesses his belief in Church
thesis and in arithmetical realism.
>If your "digital" copy passes the Turing test, I will not know whether
>it is a zombie or not.
Honestly I am not sure I care about what you *know* or pretend
to know, I'm afraid.
The real question is the following. Suppose for the sake of the
argument than your daughter falls in love with my "digital" copy.
And suppose that *in all apparences" my "digital" copy *seems* in
love with your daughter.
Would you agree with my "digital" copy getting married with
your daughter?
BTW how do you know *I* am not a zombie?
In these matter we can only bet, isn't it? (with comp this is
a theorem).
Best Regards
Bruno
Received on Tue Jan 11 2000 - 02:58:30 PST