Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

From: ronaldheld <RonaldHeld.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 2 Mar 2009 04:17:25 -0800 (PST)

Maybe the terminology does not fit here, to make a copy of my brain,
wouldn't you need more than memories, but the state of the brain at
one time to "quantum resolution" (TNG transporter term).
                            Ronald

On Feb 23, 9:04 pm, Stathis Papaioannou <stath....domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> 2009/2/24 Brent Meeker <meeke....domain.name.hidden>:
>
> > I tend to agree with Quentin that memories are an essential component of
> > personal identity.  But that also raises a problem with ideas like
> > "observer moments" and "continuity".  Almost all my memories are not
> > being remembered at an given time.  Some I may not recall for years at a
> > time.  I may significant periods of time in which I am not consciously
> > recalling any memories.  So then how can memories and continuity be
> > essential?  I practice we rely on continuity of the body and then ask,
> > "Does this body have (some) appropriate memories?"
>
> The continuity is contingent on having access to the relevant memories
> as required. If you are listening to a recording the parts where the
> music plays must be from that particular recording, but the silent
> parts could as easily be from any other recording. In the same way, if
> you are staring at a blank wall thinking of nothing for a moment, then
> during that moment you might be a generic human having such a similar
> experience.
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list.domain.name.hidden
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe.domain.name.hidden
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
Received on Mon Mar 02 2009 - 07:17:28 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:15 PST