Re: [Fwd: NDPR David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics: A Brief Introduction]

From: Bruno Marchal <>
Date: Fri, 27 Feb 2009 19:21:02 +0100

On 27 Feb 2009, at 10:34, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> 2009/2/27 Bruno Marchal <>:
>> Gosh! And what if the backup has been done last year, or one
>> minute ago? I
>> will be dead too? Less dead?
> This shows a potential problem the psychological criterion for
> personal identity. If I am facing death it is little consolation to me
> if a backup was made an hour ago, since I (the presently speaking I)
> will not be able to anticipate any future experiences. Only if there
> exists some copy who will have a memory of my present experiences
> would I not object to dying, and this would require a backup updated
> every moment. In that case, I should also object to an hour of memory
> loss, due to a medication like midazolam. But I don't think that
> taking midazolam is tantamount to dying. Inconsistency! Either I have
> to agree that taking midazolam is like dying, or I have to agree that
> dying while leaving an old (how old?) backup behind does not matter.
> If I agree to the latter, then I give up worrying about the thing I
> don't like about dying, which is the fact that I won't be able to
> anticipate any future experiences. And if I give up worrying about
> that, then there isn't anything else that worries me about dying. So
> if I think that taking midazolam is no big deal (which I do), to be
> consistent I should also think that death is no big deal.

Correct, but only at the G* level. Assuming comp this seems to me
valid. (but you can't *known* that comp is correct, beware the trap).
Death and suffering of others still matters, which makes me doubt this
is a serious problem for the psychological criterion of personal
identity. Eventually it is only a problem of right, or a tree of
sequences of problems of right.


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at
Received on Fri Feb 27 2009 - 13:21:14 PST

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.0 : Fri Feb 16 2018 - 13:20:15 PST