Re: Personal Identity and Ethics

From: Bruno Marchal <marchal.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2009 18:21:46 +0100

On 21 Feb 2009, at 07:35, Brent Meeker wrote:

>
> Stephen Paul King wrote:
>> Hi Stathis,
>>
>> A question : Is is incorrect of me to infer that the psychological
>> criterion of personal identity discussed in Shoemaker's book and,
>> by your
>> statement below, used by a predominance of members of this list is
>> one that
>> treats conscious self-awareness as an epiphenomena arrising from a
>> Classical
>> system and that it is, at least tacitly, assumed that quantum
>> effects have
>> no supervenience upon any notion of Consciousness?
>> While I welcome the rejection of notion of "Souls" which are in
>> principle non-verifiable, could we be endulging in meaningless
>> chatter about
>> computerizing consciousness if we do not first determen that
>> consciousness
>> is a purely classical epiphenomena? After all we are repeatedly
>> told that it
>> is the classical view of the Universe and all within it is a theory
>> long ago
>> refuted.
>>
> There's no inconsistency between the universe being quantum
> mechanical,
> while human thought processes are essentially classical. The
> classical
> world emerges from the quantum in the limit of large action.

I find this most plausible. And I think that this does not contradict
the fact that comp makes the quantum itself emerging from all
computations, which are generally definable in pure classical
arithmetic, combinators, etc.
There should be a back and forth between bits and qubits.
(Assuming ...).

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Received on Thu Feb 26 2009 - 12:21:50 PST

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