Re: continuity - cloning

From: GŁnther Greindl <>
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2009 12:31:07 +0100


As Stathis and Quentin wrote, we have approached the core of the

You (Jack) seem to have a very "quaint" idea of personal identity - some
kind of essentialism. Strange that you hold that theory and call talk of
1st person/3rd person distinction "sloganeering".

It seems, perhaps, that the sloganeers have a much more scientific
concept of personal identity than you do?


Jack Mallah wrote:
> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Stathis Papaioannou <> wrote:
>> You agree that if one version of me goes to bed tonight and one version of me wakes up tomorrow, then I should expect to wake up tomorrow. But if extra versions of me are manufactured and run today, then switched off when I go to sleep, then you are saying that I might not wake up tomorrow.
> You won't know this evening if you are one of the "extra versions" or the original. So yes, in that situation, you will probably not be around tomorrow. Only the original will.
>> The extra copies of me have somehow sapped my life strength.
> Not at all. I guess that is a joke?
> Creating more copies, then getting rid of the same number, does not result in a net decrease in measure. That is why the movie "The Prestige" bears no resemblance whatsoever to QS despite rumors to the contrary.
> If you create extra copies and leave them alive, there is a net increase in measure. That is equivalent to new people being born even if they have your memories. This once happenned to Will Riker on Star Trek: TNG.
> >

GŁnther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
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Received on Thu Feb 12 2009 - 06:30:40 PST

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