And could you explicit the "not by you", if the "me" of 1000 years old has
all my memories up to now (+ his own from now on to 1000 years old)... It is
me, if you disagree what is personnal identity for you ? What is the magical
"I" you're talking about ?
Quentin
2009/2/12 Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
>
>
> 2009/2/12 Jack Mallah <jackmallah.domain.name.hidden>
>
>>
>> --- On Wed, 2/11/09, Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
>> > > > From a 1st perspective commonness is useless in
>> > the argument. The important is what it feels like for the experimenter.
>> > >
>> > > You seem to be saying that commonness of an experience has no effect
>> on, what for practical purposes, is whether people should expect to
>> experience it. That is a contradiction in terms. It is false by
>> definition. If an "uncommon" experience gets experienced just as often as a
>> "common" experience, then by definition they are equally common and have
>> equal measure.
>> > >
>> > That's not what I said. I said however uncommon an experience is, if it
>> exists... it exists by definition, if mwi is true, and measure is never
>> strictly null for any particular moment to have a successor then any moment
>> has a successor hence there exists a me moment of 1000 years old and it is
>> garanteed to be lived by definition.
>>
>> It will be experienced - but not by most of "you". For all practical
>> purposes it might as well not exist.
>
>
> Well either the measure is strictly null and then I agree it does not exist
> or it is not null and therefore it exists (by MWI). This all boils down to:
>
> - If there always exists a moment after any given moment then from 1st
> person perspective you will be one of the available next moment whatever it
> is (and whatever low absolute measure it could have, but with the most
> probable expectation given by the highest measure next moment where you
> exist).
> - If there isn't then OK, QI is false.
>
> But here you're not clear at all, if the measure never drop to null, your
> conclusion is erroneous.
>
>
>>
>>
>> > What you're saying is uncommon moment are *never* experienced (means
>> their measure is strictly null), for the QI argument to hold it is suffisant
>> to have at least *one* next moment for every moment.
>>
>> No and no.
>>
>>
> Yes and yes or I don't understand what you're talking about.
>
> Regards,
> Quentin
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> >>
>>
>
>
> --
> All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
>
--
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Received on Thu Feb 12 2009 - 02:27:33 PST