Re: briefly wading back re: BB's and measure

From: Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden>
Date: Mon, 9 Feb 2009 20:31:02 +0100

2009/2/9 Jack Mallah <jackmallah.domain.name.hidden>

>
> --- On Sat, 2/7/09, Quentin Anciaux <allcolor.domain.name.hidden> wrote:
> > 2009/2/7 Jack Mallah <jackmallah.domain.name.hidden>
> > > 1. Initially, before evolution occurred, a typical Boltzmann brain (BB)
> had about the same measure as a brain which was like what we consider a
> normal person's (an atypical BB).
> > > 2. The typical BB's all together vastly outnumbered the atypical ones,
> so they had much more total measure.
> > > 3. We are assuming here that a person's measure can't change as a
> function of time.
> > > 4. Therefore the initial measure advantage of the typical BB's would
> hold for all time.
> >
> > You are here explicitely assuming ASSA, meaning that there exists an
> absolute measure over all OM... which seems to me dubious. Your argument
> here is not valid for relative continuation (RSSA).
>
> Hi. In the above, I was describing the consequences of #3, the assumption
> that a person's measure can't change over time. That assumption is
> certainly not what people have been calling the "ASSA" - obviously, I
> believe that measure does change as a function of time. Rather, #3 is my
> attempt to put what you call the "RSSA" in well-defined terms so that its
> consequences can be explored.
>
> > > Instead I covered the Bayesian issues in my sections on the Reflection
> Argument and Theory Confirmation.
> > >
> > What measure then are you talking about ? Bayesian probabilities are
> relative, it is non-sense to talk about absolute measure.
>
> I don't understand your comment. The sections of my paper that I mentioned
> explain how to use what I call "effective probabilities" in certain
> situations. If there is a problem with those procedures that you would like
> to point out, that would make it impossible to use them, you'd have to be a
> lot more specific.
>
> > > > He goes on to mention rather briefly in passing his doomsday style
> > > > argument against QI, but not in detail.
> > >
> > > I think the argument is presented in full. What part is missing?
> >
> > What happen to your "you" ?
>
> Do you mean "why don't you reach the super-old ages"? The number of
> super-old "copies of you" is much less than for normal ages. This is
> equivalent to "most copies of you die off first". Which is equivalent to
> "most people die off first". It is irrelevant whether the people are
> different, or similar enough to be called "copies".
>

I find it dubious for a moment to have a measure by itself and that from
moment to moment this measure decrease. I could accept that two moments
relative to each other have a certain probability to be the successor of
each other and it means something.

Also I still don't understand how I could be 30 years old and not 4, there
are a lot more OM of 4 than 30... it is the argument you use for 1000 years
old, I don't see why it can hold for 30 ? Also even if absolute measure had
sense, do you mean that the measure of a 1000 years old OM is strictly zero
(not infinitesimal, simply and strictly null) ? If it is what you mean,
could you prove it ?


>
> The You you know (no quotes around it this time) is just one copy among the
> "you" ones that are similar to you.
>
> In other words, perhaps too compactly said for people to appreciate, "your"
> measure is reduced.
>
>
My measure relative to what ?

Regards,
Quentin

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-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.
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Received on Mon Feb 09 2009 - 14:31:09 PST

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